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STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
T h :i • i s s u e s p ii" e s e in t e d f :: i : i: e v i e w • ::> i: i 1 1 i :ii s A p p e a 1 a m : e: 
] w h e t h er t h e t ria1 c ourt e r r e d wh e n 11 h e 1 d t ha t t he 
m o d I f i c a t i o n t o P a 1: a g r a ph 3 o £ t h e Le a s e Ag r e em e n t " t o r e d 11 c e the 
r - . 1 0 0 0 J;: • € • 1: [ m o 1 11 h ] f' w a s f o i: a p e 1: i • :> d ::> f o 1: 1 e y e a r o 1: 115 » 
2 Whether the accep tance by a l e s s o r , wi thout com-
p ' ' ' ' $ II 0 0 0 0 0 j : e 1: 11101 11 h a • 3 1: e 1: 11 f : 1: a p e 1: :i :> c:l :> I: ::) * , e 1  : t: A : 
a n a • ^  t— h a I f ( 2 1 / 2 ) y e a r s , b a r s , :i 1:1 w h o 1 e o 1: :i 1: 1 p a i: t ,• a s ub s e -
quent lawsui t for arrearages i n rent. 
3 Wh e 11 1 e 1: 11: 1 e 11: I a 1 ::• :> u r t e 1: r e• ::I :i 1: 1 r u 1 i ng t h at the 
provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement provided for 
ad j 1 -. tm e n t s i r 1 t h e m o n t h 1 y r e n t b a s e d \ 1 p o 1 1. 11 1 e " C o n s 1 im e r P r i c e 
Index All Urban Consumers" when the Lease Agreement provided 
that adjustments were to be determined by the "United states Cost 
c f I ti v i ng Index, " • ' ' • 
4• Whether a judgment for arrearages in property tax 
payments may be entered in an action when the underlying Lease 
provides that'" [t]he Lessor shall pay the said property uaxes 
annually, and i n the event said taxes shall increase in .: n 
i • .-*-- ~ :~ r i ' 51? s I: i c 1! II lb e :11 1 » t h e I i.e s s < 1 
t: he Lessee -;- - >.- ~ - L - J O , ^ 1 ga y raent o f the s a m e ' M he proof 
.••:f payment of such increase is presented by the lessor t „ t**u 
x ••: . J u n t i l tl le ti me of ti: ial. 
5, Whether attorney's fees may be awarded upon the basis 
Q£ what t he t r i a l cot • • - "iris "reasonable" wh< EMI no d i r e c t evii der ,ce 
regarding the amount at time actually spent i 1:1 enforcing contrac-
tual provisions is presented. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from certain Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions"1) and a cer-
tain Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District 
Judge, presiding. The Findings and Conclusions and Judgment were 
entered in an action brought by plaintiffs-respondents Robert W. 
Barnes, Jr., David C. Barnes and Susan B. Nielson, d/b/a The 
Barnes Family Partnership (collectively referred to herein as 
the "Partnership"), for alleged arrearages in the rent due for 
the lease of certain premises and a surrounding parking lot and 
75% of the increase in property taxes on the leased premises from 
and after September 1, 1976. The sums were alleged to be due 
and owing pursuant to a certain Lease Agreement dated September 
1, 1976, between the Partnership's predecessor in interest, 
Jacqueline Barnes, and the defendant-appellant Richard C. Wood, 
d/b/a Fernwood Candy & Ice Cream Company. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Prior to trial, defendant Marilyn P. Wood died. This 
matter proceeded to trial against Richard C. Wood, d/b/a Fernwood 
Candy & Ice Cream Company, only. A non-jury trial was held 
before the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding ("Trial 
Court"), on August 14, 15 and 16, 1984. The Partnership pro-
ceeded to trial on two causes of action. The First Cause of 
Action was for the alleged breach of the Lease Agreement dated 
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alleged misrepresentations and fraud commi11ed by the defendant-
appellant Richard C. Woo< I ( nWo< xl" or fl Fern woods" ) , [First 
Amended Coinj: 1 a:ii i ill! , I ! ] 3 4 3 48] 
Wood defended on the grounds that there had been, a modi -
fication of the Lease Agreement, pursuant to which modification 
Pernwoods was +-o pay ^ he sum, of $1,00 0 00 ($900.00 for the prem-
ises
 fj^d c , :,-;. ::he parking lot) per month rent for the 
• * . - :e rm. "I I'o :> :1, fi ri: t h e r s< ::: \ lgh t *i l forcemei it 
c>t •> Lease Agreement a s m o d i f i e d . In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , - Wood 
ril^-^qp^ th~** "- - Ji-rr- found t h a t t h e Lease Agreement had n o t 
faeen mod i f ied,- t h e Pai: t n e r s h i p and i t s p r e d e c e s s o r I i I i i I t e r e s t 
were barred from, asserting their claims for arrearages in rent 
hy 3 reason ::: f 1: :t,a J ii i: i,g a c c e p t e d ; ,: ii tl: icn it ::: fc j e zi't::! <:: i: I , tl: :t,e si im o f 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r month f o r more t l lan two and o n e - h a l f y e a r s . Wood 
defended the claim, for back property taxes on the ground that the 
P a r t: i I e r s h i j: I: i a, d f a i ] e d t: :: ITI, 2 e t a c« :> i: I d i t ii • :> i i j: i: e c e d e i 11 t :: 11: :t, e 
necessity of payment of said taxes by Fernwoods, i.e., the tender 
t Q pernwoods of proof of pa,yment lby the Partnershi p of ar ,} r 
increase in property taxes. Wood also denied that 1 :i,e I: lad com-
mitted any fraud or .misrepresentation whatsoever, [Answer to 
Pi rwt- AmpndPd i 'nmpl a I, nl U I n r - 1 '•> / I . 
On August 3 0, 1984, Judge Sawayi entered his rul ing. 
Th a t r u 1 i n g pr ov i d e d,: 
1/ That the lease agreement was modified by 
the actions of the parties, and that there is 
no finding of misrepresentation or fraud on 
the part, of the defendants. 
2/ "The agrement [sic] / lease, however is found 
to have been modified as alleged by the plain-
- 3 -
tiff, i.e., with a $900.00 base upon which 
the escalation provisions of the lease do apply 
and as set forth in their exhibits. 
3/ Plaintiff is entitled to judgment accor-
dingly with judgment for parking lot reantal 
[sic] and past due taxes pursuant to the 
lease and as contended by the plaintiff. 
[R. 227]. 
On September 14, 1984, counsel for the Partnership 
submitted a certain Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees [R. 256-257] 
seeking attorneys' fees of $9,850.00 and costs in the sum of 
$526.34. Wood objected to the Affidavit on the ground that it 
did not differentiate between the time spent by counsel for the 
Partnership in enforcing the provisions of the Lease Agreement 
and the time expended attempting to prove fraud on the part of 
Wood. [R. 258-272; R. 709-722]. The Hearing on Defendants' 
Objections to Plaintiffs' Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
was held before the Trial Court on October 15, 1984. At the 
conclusion of the Hearing, the Trial Court held that "the fraud 
claim upon which Plaintiffs did not prevail and the prosecution 
of that theory reasonably involved one-third of the time of 
plaintiff's counsel. The amount claimed for attorney's fees is 
therefore decreased by one-third." [R. 285]. 
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
[Addendum "A" hereto; R. 289-296] and the final Judgment [Adden-
dum "B" hereto; R. 286-288] sought to be reviewed on this Appeal 
were executed by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, 
on November 2, 1984 and entered on the Judgment Roll on November 
6, 1984. The Judgment provided, in pertinent part: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that: 
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1. Plaintiffs have Judgment against defen-
dants on their First Cause of Action for 
back rent based upon the escalation provi-
sions of the Lease using $900.00 as a base 
rent as of September 1, 1979 with adjust-
ments thereon yearly thereafter based upon 
the Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consum-
ers, plus interest thereon at the legal rate 
compounded annually, for a total deficit of 
$13,072.77 up to and including the date of 
trial. In addition, the monthly rent as of 
September 1, 1983 shall be $1,191.86, plus 
escalations thereon pursuant to paragraph 3 
of the Lease Agreement and the agreement of 
the parties; 
2. Plaintiffs have Judgment against defen-
dants on plaintiffs' First Cause of Action 
for back rent under the parking lot sublease 
based upon an agreement of the parties that 
defendants were to pay 75% of such parking 
lot lease, plus accrued interest compounded 
annually at the legal rate, for a total of 
$4,718.82. In addition, the monthly parking 
lot rent from and after September 1, 1983 
shall be Seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
Lease rate charged to plaintiffs. 
3. Plaintiffs have Judgment against defen-
dants on plainiffs1 [sic] First Cause of 
Action for increases in property taxes over 
the 1976 base, plus accrued interest com-
pounded annually at the legal rate, for a 
total of $1,081.05 up to and including 1983. 
In addition, defendants are responsible for 
any further increases in property taxes as 
set forth in the Lease and by the agreement 
of the parties; 
4. Plaintiffs have Judgment against defen-
dants on plaintiffs' First Cause of Action 
for attorneys' fees of $6,566.66 and costs 
of $476.34. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On September 1, 1976, Jacqueline C. Barnes, as 
"Lessor," and Richard C. Wood and Marilyn P. Wood, d/b/a Fernwood 
Candy & Ice Cream Company, as "Lessee," executed a certain Lease 
Agreement pursuant to which Fernwood Candy & Ice Cream Company 
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leased certain real property and a building located at 3364 South 
2300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. [Addendum "C" hereto; Ex. 1; 
R. 577]. The Lease was for a period of ten (10) years, from 
September 1, 1976 to and until September 1, 1986. [Ex. 1, J 2]. 
2. Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement provides: 
The Lessee agrees to pay as rent for the said 
premises a minimum guaranteed rental of Seven 
Hundred Fifty and No/100 ($750.00) each month 
payable in advance on the first day of each 
month, the first and last two (2) months pay-
able upon execution hereof. However, the 
monthly rental shall be adjusted upward or 
downward based upon the United States Cost 
of Living Index using August 1976 as a base, 
provided that the index must rise or fall 5% 
from the base or prior adjusted level before 
adjustments in the rent are made. 
[Addendum MC,f] (Emphasis added). 
3. Paragraph 4 of the Lease Agreement provides in 
pertinent part: 
. . . The Lessor agrees that they [sic] 
shall pay the general property taxes upon 
the real property and building, subject to 
this Lease . . . Provided, however, that 
in the event that the general property 
taxes upon the said real property and 
building shall increase during the term 
of this lease more than five (5%) percent 
in excess of the taxes for the year 1976, 
that the Lessor shall pay such increase to 
and including the said five (5%) percent, 
and any increase in excess of five percent 
(5%) over the taxes for the year 1976 shall 
be paid 25% by the Lessor and 75% by the 
Lessee . . . The Lessor shall pay the said 
property taxes annually, and in the event 
the said taxes shall increase in any year 
in excess of the 5% as provided above, 75% 
of such increases shall be due the Lessor 
from the Lessee upon proof of payment of 
the same, and such amount, if any, shall 
be payable as additional rental not later 
than December 1 of each and every year in 
which the additional tax is assessed. 
[Addendum "C"] (Emphasis added). 
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4. Under the provisions of Paragraph 10 of the Lease 
Agreement, Jacqueline Barnes subleased to Fernwoods her lease in 
the parking lot surrounding the leased premises. Under the 
provisions of Paragraph 10, Fernwoods was responsible for making 
monthly payments in the sum of $55.00 per month under the terms 
of the Lease Agreement pertaining to the parking lot. 
5. Paragraph 14 of the Lease Agreement provides: 
The Lessor and the Lessee each agree that 
should they default in any of the covenants 
or agreements contained herein, that the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee which may arise or accrue from enforc-
ing this agreement, whether such enforce-
ment is pursued by filing of suit or other-
wise. 
[Addendum "C"]. 
6. The Lease Agreement was drafted and prepared by 
Raymond A. Hintze, Esq., counsel for the Lessor, Jacqueline 
Barnes. [R. 374, 520]. The language used therein was selected 
by Hintze. [R. 374]. The use of the "United States Cost of 
Living Index" to determine increases or decreases in the monthly 
rental amount due under Paragraph 3 the Lease was the decision of 
Mr. Hintze and Jacqueline Barnes. [R. 520]. 
7. Fernwoods was not represented by counsel during the 
negotiations leading to the execution of the Lease Agreement. 
[R. 581]. Richard Wood conducted the negotiations on behalf of 
Fernwoods. [R. 581]. 
8. During the negotiations leading to the execution of 
the Lease Agreement no discussions were held concerning the 
use of the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers" Index for 
the purpose of determining increases or decreases in rent under 
- 7 -
Paragraph 3. In addition, no discussions were held regarding 
the use of a regional as opposed to a national index, whether 
regional indexes were, in fact, available for use in determining 
adjustments to the rental obligation, or the existence of index 
subcategories for determining adjustments in rent* [R. 522, 578]. 
9. At the time the Lease Agreement was executed, Wood 
had no independent knowledge of the existence or non-existence 
of the "United States Cost of Living Index" and simply acquiesced 
to the request of Jacqueline Barnes and Hintze that the "United 
States Cost of Living Index" be utilized to determine increases 
or decreases in rent. [R. 520]. 
10. The Lease Agreement, while providing for the monthly 
payment of rent, does not contain a covenant of continued posses-
sion. Thus, while Fernwoods has the obligation, inter alia, 
of paying rent, abandonment of the premises is not prohibited by 
the terms of the Lease Agreement. [Ex. 1]. 
11. In 1979, the Fernwoods Palace, which occupied the 
leased premises, experienced business losses. As of August 31, 
1979, the Palace was operating at a net loss for the year of 
$1,366.68. [Ex. 24; R. 588]. This trend continued throughout 
1979. By October 31, 1979, the Palace was operating at a 
loss of $3,450.26. [Ex. 25; R. 592]. As of December 31, 1979, 
the Palace was operating at a loss of $2,716.84. [Ex. 26; 
R. 593, 594]. 
12. On or about September 6, 1979, Raymond A. Hintze, 
attorney for Jacqueline Barnes, sent a letter to Wood informing 
him of an increase in rent for the Fernwoods Palace under Para-
graph 3 of the Lease Agreement. [Addendum "D" hereto; Ex. 7; 
- 8 -
R. 354]. The letter requested an increase in the monthly rent 
for the building to $960.00 and an increase to $100.00 per month 
for the parking lot, for a total payment of $1,060.00 per month. 
The letter also requested $118.81 for property tax increases for 
calendar years 1977 and 1978. 
13. The letter from Raymond Hintze dated September 6, 
1979, did not indicate that the increase in rent had been 
calculated on the basis of the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban 
Consumers" Index prepared by the United States Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. [Ex. 7]. 
14. In accordance with Hintze's letter of September 6, 
1979, Fernwoods paid the sum of $1,060.00 per month in rent 
for October, November and December of 1979 and January of 1980. 
[R. 515, 586]. However, given the business losses being sus-
tained by the Fernwoods Palace, Wood, individually and through 
his attorney, Gaylen Young, entered into negotiations with 
Jacqueline Barnes and Hintze for a reduction in rent. [R. 531, 
594, 596, 597]. Unless the rent escalation provision set forth 
in Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement were deleted and a fixed 
monthly rental figure for the remainder of the Lease term was 
agreed upon, Wood believed that it would be necessary to close 
the Fernwoods Palace. [R. 533, 619]. Richard Wood and Gaylen 
Young testified that in all communications with Mrs. Barnes 
[R. 616, 617, 618] and Hintze [R. 531, 533, 536, 540, 553, 557, 
559], Wood and Young stated that Fernwoods desired a fixed 
rental amount for the remainder of the lease term. Hintze 
testified that such statements were not made to him. [R. 386, 
390] . 
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15. On or about January 23, 1980, Hintze, on behalf of 
Jacqueline Barnes, sent a letter to Gaylen Young which stated in 
pertinent part: 
. . . I have met with Jackie concerning the 
Palace lease with Fernwoods and she is willing 
to reduce the rent to $1,000 per rent [sic] 
and forego her claim to the taxes which have 
accrued. 
[Addendum "E" hereto; Ex. 9; R. 363-364]. Hintze testified that 
the sentence should read " . . . she is willing to reduce the 
rent to $1,000 per month and forego her claim to the taxes which 
have accrued . . .If [R. 364]. 
16. Between the time the letter dated January 23, 1980 
was dictated by Hintze and the time it was mailed, Jacqueline 
Barnes was killed. [R. 391-392]. Hintze therefore added a 
hand-written postscript to the January 23, 1980 letter which 
stated: "P.S. Jackie's personal representative agreed to the 
1,000 per month." [Ex. 9; R. 392]. 
17. Commencing on February 1, 1980, Fernwoods made 
monthly rental payments to the Jacqueline Barnes Estate in the 
amount of $1,000.00 per month, $900.00 for the building and 
$100.00 for the parking lot, which payments were accepted by the 
Jacqueline Barnes Estate without objection. [R. 545, 563, 598]. 
18. Wood discovered that Jacqueline Barnes had failed 
to renew the parking lot lease attached to the Lease Agreement 
[Ex. 2] prior to its expiration. [R. 564, 599, 600]. As a 
consequence, rather than the parking lot lease being renewed 
for a period of five years, it was renewed for only three. In 
addition, the Lessor of the parking lot raised the monthly 
rental fee. [Compare Ex. 2 and Ex. 3]. Learning of this, 
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Wood was concerned that in the future the Lessor of the parking 
lot may not renew the Lease. Because of this uncertainty, 
Wood, both individually [R. 564, 601; Ex. 12] and through his 
attorney, Gaylen Young [R. 543; Ex. 10], attempted to negotiate 
a further reduction in the rental amount payable to the Estate of 
Jacqueline Barnes. [Ex. 10; Ex. 11; Ex. 12]. These negotiations 
were terminated upon receipt of a letter dated March 24, 1980 
from Hintze, then representing the personal representative of 
the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes. [R. 347, 602]. 
19. Hintze's letter of March 24, 1980, provided in 
pertinent part: 
We are unwilling to accept your counter pro-
posal on the lease. We would be willing to 
advertise the Palace for rent and obtain a 
tenant for your space and, providing that we 
are able to obtain a substitute leasee [sic] 
on the same terms as your lease, we would 
hold you responsible only for the cost of 
leasing and the rent until the new tenant 
takes possession of the building. Other-
wise, we would expect full compliance with 
the present lease agreement as modified by 
our January 25 [sic], 1980 letter. 
[Addendum ,fFM hereto; Ex. 13; R. 370] (Emphasis added). 
20. Richard Wood and Gaylen Young testifed that they 
believed that the January 23, 1980 and March 24, 1980 letters 
from Hintze modified Paragraphs 3 and 10 of the Lease Agreement 
to provide for a fixed monthly rental payment of $1,000.00 for 
the building and parking lot. [R. 541, 569, 598, 602]. Hintze 
testified that he intended any modification of the escalation 
clause of the Lease to be only for a period of one year. [R. 
392]. Hintze further testified, however, that he did not com-
municate to either Gaylen Young or Richard Wood that any modi-
fication to the Lease Agreement was to be for only one year. 
[R. 392, 393]. 
21. From February, 1980 until February 1981, Fernwoods 
paid and the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes accepted monthly rental 
checks in the sum of $1,000,00. [R. 400]. No objection to the 
amount tendered was raised by either the Estate of Jacqueline 
Barnes or its legal representative, Raymond Hintze, nor was any 
increase in rent for either the building or the parking lot re-
quested. 
22. By letter dated January 20, 1981, plaintiff-respondent 
David C. Barnes informed Fernwood Candy & Ice Cream Company that 
the leased property had been deeded to the Barnes Family Partner-
ship. [Ex. 15]• Fernwoods was requested to send its lease payments 
to the Barnes Family Partnership, c/o R. J. Mackleprang, C.P.A. 
[Ex. 15; R. 603]. In accordance with those instructions, commenc-
ing on February 1, 1981, Fernwoods tendered the sum of $1,000.00 
per month to "The Barnes Family Partnership, c/o R. J. Mackleprang, 
C.P.A." [R. 603]. Between February 1, 1981 and October 12, 1982, 
no objection to those payments was made by the Partnership, no 
increase in rent was requested, and no demand for payments for 
increases in property taxes was made. [R. 414, 422, 425, 426, 
429, 604]. 
23. On or about October 12, 1982, the Partnership sent 
a letter to Wood demanding back rental payments and property 
taxes totaling the sura of $6,577.57 and demanded lease payments 
commencing November 1, 1982 totaling $1,389.04 per month. 
[Addendum "G" hereto; Ex. 14]. Fernwoods rejected the demand for 
back rental payments and property taxes, and refused to increase 
its monthly rental payments of $1,000.00 per month. 
24. In addition, the letter dated October 12, 1982 
stated: 
You will also find enclosed a copy of a lease 
agreement executed by and between ourselves 
and Verl and Jean Staten on August 31, 1982. 
Under the terms of the Fernwood-Barnes lease 
in paragraph 10, it was agreed to sub-lease 
the parking lot to you. No provision is evi-
dent for the sharing of costs of this lease 
and yet we note in Mr. Hintze's letter of 
September 6, 1979 that your share was to be 
one-half of the total parking lot lease pay-
ment. We are willing to abide by this ar-
rangement. 
[Addendum "G"; Ex. 14]. 
25. The members of the Partnership did not discover the 
existence of the Hintze letter dated January 23, 1980 until after 
the filing of this lawsuit. [R. 413, 414, 426, 427, 428]. 
26. Subsequent to October 12, 1982, Fernwoods continued 
to pay, and the Barnes Family Partnership continued to accept and 
process for payment, monthly rental checks in the sum of $1,000.00. 
[R. 415, 416, 431, 432]. 
27. Prior to the trial of this action the Partnership did 
not tender to Wood or Fernwoods proof that the Partnership had 
paid any increases in property taxes due and owing on the leased 
premises. [R. 414, 430, 605]. 
28. There exists no compilation of economic statistics 
styled the "United States Cost of Living Index." [R. 434]. 
During the course of trial, and over the objections of defense 
counsel [R. 434, 474, 475, 510] the Trial Court allowed the 
Partnership to introduce evidence concerning an increase in the 
"Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average" 
for the purpose of determining escalations in the rent under 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement. [Addendum "H" hereto; R. 
434-443, 510; Ex. 16]. The objections to the admissibility of 
evidence concerning increases in the "Consumer Price Index -
All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average" were based upon the 
following: 
(a) Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement [Ex. 1] 
provided that "the monthly rent shall be adjusted 
upward or downward based upon the United States Cost of 
Living Index using August 1976 as a base," not the 
Consumer Price Index. [R. 434]. 
(b) The Consumer Price Index has two major cate-
gories, "All Urban Consumers, CPI-U," and "Urban Wage 
Earners and Clerical Workers, CPI-W." [R. 465; Ex. 22]. 
In addition, each of these major categories is divided 
into various geographical areas, including the "U.S. City 
Average." [Addendum "I" hereto; R. 462; Ex. 22]. These 
categories are divided into subcategories consisting of 
"All Items," "Food and Beverages," "Housing," "Apparel 
and Upkeep," "Transportation," "Medical Care," "Enter-
tainment" and "Other Goods and Services." [See generally 
Addendum "I" and Ex. 22]. Accordingly, even if the 
Trial Court were to assume that the parties intended to 
use the Consumer Price Index, the category to be used 
in determining increases would be purely speculative. 
Accordingly, there was no meeting of the minds. [R. 
474] . 
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(c) No foundation was established for utilizing 
the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, CPI-U" 
for determining escalations in the Lease Agreement [R. 
474, 510]. 
29. The Trial Court awarded the Partnership judgment 
for arrearages in rent from and after September 1, 1980, based 
upon escalations in the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Con-
sumers, U.S. City Average," [Ex. 16, p. 2; Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact, 1Mi 21, 22, R. 293, 
and Conclusions of Law, 11 11, R. 295; Judgment, 1[ 1; R. 286-287]. 
30. Over the objections of defense counsel [R. 348, 349, 
350, 353], the Trial Court allowed plaintiffs for the first time 
to present proof, during trial, of payment by the Partnership 
of an increase in property taxes. [Ex. 6; R. 348-353]. Such 
proof of payment had not previously been tendered to Wood or 
Fernwoods. [R. 414, 430, 605]. While the Trial Court stated 
that it was accepting Exhibit 6 only for the purpose of showing 
the amount of taxes that had been paid, and not as "proof 
of tender to the defendant or a submission to him of the amount 
of taxes that have been paid" [R. 349], the Trial Court awarded 
judgment to plaintiffs for 75% of the increase in property taxes 
over the 1976 base, from 1980 to and including 1983. [Judgment, 
11 3; R. 287] . 
31. Notwithstanding the agreement of the Partnership to 
accept one-half of the amounts due and owing by the Partnership 
to the Lessor of the parking lot from Fernwoods [Addendum "G"; 
Ex. 14; R. 414, 431], the Trial Court awarded judgment to the 
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Partnership for 75% of the amount to be paid by the Partnership 
pursuant to the parking lot lease. [Judgment, 1[ 2; R. 287]. 
32. It was stipulated by counsel for the parties that 
upon notification of the Trial Court's decision, the prevailing 
party could submit an Affidavit of Costs and Attorneys' Fees to 
be considered in conjunction with an award of attorneys' fees and 
costs pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 14 of the Lease 
Agreement. [R. 523-524]. On August 30, 1984, the Court entered 
its Minute Ruling. [R. 227]. In accordance with the Stipulation, 
counsel for the Partnership filed an Affidavit of Attorneys' 
Pees. [Addendum "J" hereto; R. 256-257]. In the Affidavit, 
counsel for the Partnership represented that the attorneys' fees 
expended totaled the sum of $9,850.00 and costs were incurred 
in the sum of $526.34, a sum which included a $50.00 jury fee. 
Prior to the time of trial, the Partnership had waived its demand 
for a jury. 
33. Defendant Wood filed objections to the Partnership's 
Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on, inter alia, the 
ground that the Partnership had not met its burden of proving 
the amount of attorneys' fees and costs expended in enforcing 
the modified Lease Agreement as opposed to attempting to recover 
damages under the original, unmodified, Lease Agreement and 
attempting to prove fraud and misrepresentation on the part of 
defendant Wood. [R. 258-272]. 
34. The Hearing on the Objection to Plaintiffs' Affi-
davit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs was held on Cctober 15, 1984. 
At the Hearing, the Partnership presented no additional evidence 
as to the time reasonably incurred in enforcing the provisions 
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of the modified Lease Agreement as opposed to seeking a fraud 
judgment against defendant Wood and Fernwoods. [R. 709-721]• 
35. On October 15, 1984, the Trial Court executed a 
certain Minute Entry which stated: 
It is the opinion of the Court that the fraud 
claim upon which Plaintiffs did not prevail 
and the prosecution of that theory reasonably 
involved one-third of the time of plaintiff's 
[sic] counsel. The amount claimed for attor-
neys fees is therefore decreased by one-third. 
The objection to the claim for jury fee is 
sustained. 
[Addendum ML" hereto; R. 285]. 
36. On November 2, 1984, certain Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were executed by Judge Sawaya. [Addendum 
MA"; R. 289-296]. As set forth above, and argued more fully 
below, Findings of Fact Nos. 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, 
23, 25, 26 and 27 are not supported by the testimony presented at 
trial. In addition, Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 13 and 15 are supported neither by the facts presented at 
trial nor by applicable case law. 
37. Implicit in the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that 
the Lease Agreement had been modified for a period of one year 
[Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of 
Law, 11 2, R. 294] was the conclusion that the modification to 
the Lease Agreement was supported by consideration. 
38. On November 6, 1984, the Judgment was entered in 
this action in the Judgment Roll of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. [Addendum-"B" hereto; 
R. 286-288]. The Judgment in its entirety is pertinent to and 
involved in this Appeal. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
This Honorable Court must reverse the Judgment of the 
Trial Court entered on the Judgment Roll on November 6, 1984. 
The Trial Court's ruling that the modification to 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement was for a period of only one 
year is incorrect as a matter of law. The Lease Agreement, while 
imposing the obligation for the payment of rent, does not require 
Fernwoods to be in possession of the leased premises during the 
ten-year period of the Lease. The continued occupancy by Fern-
woods of the leased premises, when it was not otherwise obligated 
to do so, provides sufficient consideration to support the 
modification to the Lease Agreement. The modification to the 
Lease Agreement, as set forth in the January 23, 1980 Hintze 
letter, being supported by consideration, is effective for the 
remainder of the lease term. 
Moreover, at no time were either Richard Wood or Gaylen 
Young informed that the reduction in rent to $1,000.00 per month 
was to be for one year only. The January 23, 1980 letter, having 
been drafted by the attorney for the Partnership's predecessor 
in interest, must be strictly construed against the Partnership. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the modification to Paragraph 3 
of the Lease Agreement was not supported by consideration, the 
Partnership is nonetheless estopped, or is otherwise barred, from 
asserting any claim for arrearages in rent allegedly due and 
owing for the premises and the surrounding parking lot between 
February, 1980 and October 12, 1982. Between February 1, 1980 
and January 31, 1981, the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes accepted, 
- 18 -
without complaint, the sum of $1,000.00 per month from Fernwoods 
for rent of the premises and the surrounding parking lot. 
Thereafter, from February 1, 1981 through October 11, 1982, the 
Partnership accepted, without objection, the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month in rent from Fernwoods. Between February of 1980 and 
October 11, 1982, neither the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes nor the 
Partnership made any demand for an increase in rent on either the 
leased premises or the parking lot. The acceptance of the 
$1,000.00 per month payments by the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes 
and the Partnership constitutes an executed gift or waiver, and 
precludes the Partnership from thereafter recovering the full 
amount originally set forth in the Lease Agreement for the period 
between February 1, 1980 and October 1, 1982. Moreover, the 
Partnership in its October 12, 1982 letter stated it would accept 
50% of the total amount due on the parking lot lease from Fern-
woods as full payment of Fernwoods1 parking lot obligation. 
The Trial Court also committed error in allowing into 
evidence amounts allegedly due and owing pursuant to Paragraph 3 
of the Lease Agreement based upon increases in the "Consumer 
Price Index - All Urban Consumers" Index and in awarding damages 
based upon increases in the Consumer Price Index. The Lease 
Agreement provided that increases in the rental obligation 
were to be calculated on the basis of the "United States Cost 
of Living Index." The use of that index was proposed by the 
Partnership's predecessor in interest and her attorney, Raymond 
Hintze. Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement, and indeed the 
entire Lease Agreement, was drafted by Hintze. At the time the 
Lease Agreement was executed, Wood had no independent knowledge 
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of the existence or non-existence of the proposed index and 
simply acquiesced to the request of Jacqueline Barnes and Hintze 
that the "United States Cost of Living Index" be utilized to 
determine increases or decreases in rent under paragraph 3 of 
the Lease. If any mistake was made in utilizing the "United 
States Cost of Living Index" for the purpose of determining 
escalations in the rental amount due under Paragraph 3 of the 
Lease Agreement, it was a unilateral mistake of the Partnership's 
predecessor in interest, Jacqueline Barnes. The term "United 
States Cost of Living Index" is not ambiguous and, accordingly, 
the rules of construction relating to the interpretation of 
ambiguous instruments are not applicable in the case at bar. The 
parties are governed by the language of their agreement. 
In addition, the Lease Agreement is a complete and 
accurate integration of the terms mutually agreed upon during 
negotiations leading to its execution. There is no basis for 
reformation because the Lease accurately reflects the agreement 
of the parties. In awarding damages based upon an index other 
than that specified in the Lease Agreement, the Trial Court 
improperly rewrote the Lease to include terms never contemplated 
by the parties. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court erred in awarding the 
Partnership judgment for increases in property taxes. The 
Partnership failed to meet the condition precedent to bringing 
an action for payment of increases in property taxes, to wit: 
presentation to Fernwoods of proof of payment by the Partnership 
of the increase. By reason of the Partnership's failure to meet 
the condition precedent, the Judgment of the Trial Court must be 
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reversed. At a minimum, this Honorable Court must reverse that 
portion of the Judgment awarding prejudgment interest upon the 
allegedly past due and owing property taxes* 
Finally, this Court must reverse the award of attorneys' 
fees to the Partnership in the sum of $6,566.66. The Affidavits 
of Attorneys' Fees failed to specifically delineate that portion 
of the total fees necessary to enforce the modified Lease Agree-
ment. The Trial Court's ruling that two-thirds (2/3) of the 
gross number of hours expended on the entire case were reasonably 
incurred in prosecuting those issues upon which the Partnership 
prevailed was not supported by any evidence whatsoever. The 
award of attorneys' fees thus constitutes an abuse of discretion 
by the Trial Court and must be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE 
MODIFICATION TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT WAS FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR ONLY. 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement was modified to 
provide for a fixed monthly rental payment of $1,000.00 per 
month for the remainder of the lease term. 
An obligation to pay rent may be modified as to when it 
is due or as to its amount. However, a modification, to be 
binding on the parties, must be supported by consideration or 
be otherwise enforceable under contract law. See Restatement 
(Second) of Property § 12.1, Comment d (1977). There was consi-
deration for the modification to Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agree-
ment. When there is no obligation to remain in possession of 
premises, and the landlord agrees to a reduction in rent in 
exchange for continued possession, an agreement to reduce rent 
is supported by adequate consideration. 
The Lease Agreement was for a period of ten years. 
[Lease Agreement, Addendum "C"; Ex. 1, 11 2]. While the Lease 
Agreement imposed the obligation for the payment of rent, it does 
not, by its terms, require Fernwoods to be in possession of the 
leased premises during that ten-year period. By letter dated 
September 6, 1979, Raymond A. Hintze, counsel for Jacqueline 
Barnes, requested an increase in the amount of rent based upon 
"the cost of living figures from the United States government." 
Specifically, Hintze requested an increase in the rent due and 
owing for the premises from $750.00 per month to $960.00 per 
month and an increase in the parking lot rent to $100.00 per 
month. The total payment requested was thus $1,060.00 per 
month. [Addendum "D"; Ex. 7]. 
In accordance with Hintze1s letter of September 6, 1979, 
and based upon Hintze's representations that there had been an 
increase in "cost of living figures," Fernwoods paid the sum of 
$1,060.00 per month in October, November and December of 1979 and 
January of 1980. [R. 515, 586]. However, given the business 
losses being sustained by the Fernwoods Palace, Richard Wood, 
individually and through his attorney, Gaylen Young, entered into 
negotiations with Jacqueline Barnes and Raymond Hintze for a 
reduction in rent. Wood believed that unless the rent escalation 
provision set forth in Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement were 
deleted and a fixed monthly rental figure agreed to for the 
remainder of the lease term, it would probably be necessary to 
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close the Fernwoods Palace [R. 533, 619]. Richard Wood and 
Gaylen Young testified that in all communications with Jacqueline 
Barnes [R. 616, 617, 618] and Hintze [R. 531, 533, 536, 540, 553, 
557, 559] , they stated that Fernwoods desired a fixed rental 
amount for the remainder of the lease term. Hintze testified 
that such statements were not made to him. [R. 386, 390]. 
Notwithstanding the conflict in testimony, it is undis-
puted that on January 23, 1980, Raymond Hintze, acting on behalf 
of Jacqueline Barnes, sent a letter to Gaylen Young which stated 
in pertinent part: 
. . . I have met with Jackie concerning the 
Palace lease with Fernwoods and she is will-
ing to reduce the rent to $1,000 per rent 
[sic] and forego her claim to the taxes which 
have accrued. 
[Addendum "E"; Ex. 9; R. 363, 364]. During the trial, Hintze 
testified: 
[S]he [Jacqueline Barnes] did not want to hurt 
the Fernwoods and force them to leave the prem-
ises because it was basically a building that 
was made as an ice cream store; she did not 
want to try to get another tenant in there or 
do expensive remodeling. 
[R. 372] . On cross-examination, Hintze further reiterated that 
Mrs. Barnes did not want to have an empty building, to search 
for a new tenant, or to remodel the building for a new tenant. 
[R. 387, 388]. Jacqueline Barnes1 decision to modify Fernwoods' 
rental obligation was thus a business decision, reached after 
weighing the benefits of having Fernwoods remain as a tenant 
against the detriments of abandonment. 
In Jaffray v. Greenbaum, 64 Iowa 492, 29 N.W. 775 
(1884), as in the case at bar, an action was brought by a land-
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lord to collect back rent allegedly due and owing under the 
provisions of a ten-year lease. The rent, as provided in a 
written lease, was at the rate of $4,500.00 per year for the 
first five years, and at the rate of $5,000.00 per year for the 
remainder of the term. Four years into the lease, the lessee had 
financial difficulties and requested a reduction in rent from the 
landlord. The landlord orally agreed to accept a reduction in 
rent. Thereafter, the landlord brought an action for the back 
rent allegedly due and owing under the original lease agreement 
on the grounds that the modification was without consideration. 
The trial court granted judgment for the landlord and the defen-
dant appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed, 
holding that there was sufficient consideration for the reduction 
in rent. In so holding, the Court stated: 
In our opinion, a consideration was not wanting. 
We regard the case essentially the same as if 
the original lease had been surrendered and a 
new lease substituted providing for a rent of 
$3,200.00 per year. A lease which provides for 
too high a rent may be less valuable to the 
landlord than one providing for a proper rent 
. . . The lease in question, with the rent 
reduced, was preferred by these landlords as 
shown by the fact that they made the reduc-
tion on purely business reasons. 
29 N.W. at 778. 
A similar holding was reached by the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska in Bowman v. Wright, 65 Neb. 661, 91 N.W. 580 (1902), 
adhered to on reh., 65 Neb. 666, 92 N.W. 580 (1902). In Bowman, 
the heirs of a lessor brought an action against a lessee to re-
cover a balance of $25.00 per month for twenty months, which sums 
were allegedly due and owing under the provisions of a lease en-
tered into between the defendant and the plaintiffs1 predecessor 
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in interest. The original lease had provided for rent of $75.00 
per month. Thereafter, an agreement was reached between the lessee 
and the lessor whereby the lessee reduced the rent to $50.00 per 
month. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in upholding a judgment of 
the trial court in favor of the defendant lessee, stated: 
Where the lessee has not covenanted and is not 
bound to remain in possession for any purpose, 
continuing in possession at the request of the 
lessor may be consideration for an agreement 
to reduce the rent . . . It is obvious that 
for purposes of insurance and for many other 
reasons, it may be very important for the 
landlord to keep the premises occupied by the 
tenant himself; and, though the tenant may be 
bound to pay rent, he may not be bound to keep 
possession, either personally or by others. 
91 N.W. at 582. See also Hyman v. Jockey Club Wine, Liquor & 
Cigar Co., 9 Colo. App. 289, 48 P. 671, 673 (1897) ("[I]t was 
competent for the parties, by a new parol agreement, to waive 
the covenant, modify or abrogate the lease in respect to the 
amount of rent, and substitute a new agreement as to the amount, 
and the continuing tenancy of the appellee was sufficient con-
sideration for the new contract"); Minor-Dietiker v. Mary Jane 
Stores of Michigan, Inc., 2 Mich. App. 585, 141 N.W. 2d 342, 
343 (1966) ("[A] new agreement reducing the amount of rent 
payable, where the tenant continues in possession and pays the 
reduced rent, is valid, the continuing tenancy being a suffi-
cient consideration for the new contract.") (Emphasis in 
original) [quoting Eisenberg v. C.F. Battenfeld Oil Company, 
251 Mich. 654, 232 N.W. 386 (1930)]. 
In short, the continued occupancy by Fernwoods of the 
leased premises constituted sufficient consideration for the 
agreement to modify Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement. 
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Moreover, while Hintze testified that he did not intend 
the letter of January 23, 1980 to provide for a fixed rental 
amount in the sum of $1,000.00 month for the remainder of the 
lease term, the January 23, 1980 letter does not, by its terms, 
limit the $1,000.00 per month rental to one year. Indeed, 
Hintze testified that at no time did he inform either Richard 
Wood or Gaylen Young that the modification in the rental amount 
due and owing for the leased premises was limited to a one-year 
period. [R. 392, 393]. Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter modi-
fying the obligation of Pernwoods to pay rent is unambiguous on 
its face and can only be construed as an agreement on the part of 
Jacqueline Barnes and the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes to accept 
the sum of $1,000.00 per month as rent under the Lease for the 
remainder of the lease term. 
Even if one assumes arguendo that the January 23, 
1980 modification is ambiguous, the law is clear that any ambi-
guity must be resolved against the Partnership: 
The well-established rule in Utah is that any 
uncertainty with respect to the construction 
of a contract should be resolved against the 
party who had drawn the agreement. 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). See also 
Matter of Estate of Orris, 622 P.2d 337 (Utah 1980). The rule 
that a contract is to be strictly construed against the drafting 
party is particularly applicable when it has been drafted by 
that party's attorney* See, e.g., Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 
2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969). 
When the January 23, 1980 Hintze letter is construed 
against the partnership's predecessors in interest, and hence the 
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Partnership, the Court can only conclude that the agreement to 
reduce Fernwoods' rental obligation to the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month was for the remainder of the lease term. The Trial Court 
could only have forgotten, overlooked, or ignored this fundamen-
tal rule of contract construction when it found that "[n]o 
agreement was requested or made concerning the escalation provi-
sions of the Lease and the $900.00 amount remains subject to the 
escalation provisions of the Lease." [Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact, 11 16; R. 292]. 
Furthermore, it is well settled that the construction 
that the parties themselves place on an agreement is indicative 
of its meaning: 
Under the doctrine of practical construction, 
when a contract is ambiguous and the parties 
place their own construction on their agree-
ment and so perform, the court may consider 
this as persuasive evidence of what their 
true intention was. 
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975). See also 
Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). When 
the actions of Fernwoods, the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the 
Partnership subsequent to January 23, 1980 are examined, one can 
only conclude that the modification to Paragraph 3 was intended 
to be effective for the remainder of the lease term. Subsequent 
to Jacqueline Barnes1 death, Raymond Hintze acted as attorney for 
the personal representative of her Estate. [R. 347]. If the 
reduction in rent was for a period of only one year with the 
escalation provision to apply thereafter, in September of 1980 
either the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes or its legal counsel, 
Raymond Hintze, would have made a demand for an increase in 
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rent pursuant to the escalation clause. No such demand was made. 
Moreover, no demand for an increase in rent was made by the 
Partnership in September of 1981 or September of 1982. For 
almost three years Fernwoods paid, and the Estate of Jacqueline 
Barnes and the Partnership accepted, without complaint or a 
request for increase in payment, the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month as payment in full of Fernwoods1 obligation to pay rent. 
Application of the doctrine of practical construction can only 
lead to the conclusion that the modification of the rental 
obligation under Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement as set forth 
in the Hintze letter of January 23, 1980, was to be for the 
remainder of the lease term. 
In conclusion, the agreement of Jacqueline Barnes and her 
Estate to modify the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Lease to 
provide for rent in the sum of $1,000.00 per month was supported 
by consideration. Raymond Hintze's letter of January 23, 1980, 
written on behalf of Jacqueline Barnes and the Estate of Jacqueline 
Barnes, is unambiguous. It clearly states that Jacqueline Barnes, 
and her Estate, were willing to accept the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month rent for the leased premises and surrounding parking lot. 
No mention is made regarding future escalations in the amount of 
rent to be paid, nor did Hintze communicate any intention regard-
ing applying the escalation provision in the future. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the January 23, 1980, 
Hintze letter is ambiguous, under fundamental rules of contract 
construction the Trial Court could only find that the agreement 
to modify Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement was effective for 
the remainder of the lease term. Fernwoods paid the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month to the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and to 
the Partnership for a period of over two and one-half years 
without any objection being raised as to the amount tendered by 
Fernwoods, and without any request for an increase in rent 
for either the premises or the surrounding parking lot. 
The Trial Court erred when it entered Judgment in favor 
of the Partnership for $13,072.77 in rental arrearages based upon 
the escalation provisions of the Lease Agreement and ruled that 
the monthly rent, as of September 1, 1983, was to be $1,191.86 
per month, with additional escalations thereon pursuant to 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement [Judgment, 11 1]. The Trial 
Court also erred when it adjudged that Fernwoods was liable to 
the Partnership for back rent under the parking lot sublease in 
the sum of $4,718.82 and was obligated, in the future, to pay 75% 
of the lease rate charged to the Partnership. [Judgment, K 2]. 
POINT II 
THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE ESTATE 
OF JACQUELINE BARNES OF $1,000.00 PER MONTH 
FOR OVER TWO YEARS BARRED THE PARTNERSHIP'S 
ACTION FOR ARREARAGES IN RENT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the modification to Paragraph 
3 of the Lease Agreement was not supported by consideration, the 
Partnership's action for arrearages in rent would nonetheless be 
barred. Beginning on February 1, 1980 and continuing through 
January 31, 1981, Fernwoods, in reliance upon the modification 
to Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement, paid to the Estate of 
Jacqueline Barnes, and the Estate accepted without complaint 
or reservation, the sum of $1,000.00 per month rent. In January, 
_ on _ 
1981, the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes, pursuant to a certain 
Personal Representative's Deed [Ex. 5], conveyed the premises 
subject to the Lease Agreement to plaintiffs-respondents Robert 
Wo Barnes, Jr., David C. Barnes and Susan B. Nielson. By letter 
dated January 20, 1981, respondent David C. Barnes informed 
Fernwood Candy & Ice Cream Company that the leased property had 
been deeded to the Barnes Family Partnership. [Ex. 15]. Fern-
woods was requested to send its lease payments to the Barnes 
Family Partnership, c/o R. J. Mackleprang, C.P.A. [Ex. 15; R. 
603]. In accordance with those instructions, commencing on 
February 1, 1981, Fernwoods tendered the sum of $1,000.00 per 
month to the Barnes Family Partnership. [R. 603]. Between 
February 1, 1981 and October 11, 1982, no objection to those 
payments was made by the Partnership and no increase in rent 
was requested. [R. 414, 422, 425, 426, 429, 604]. 
Under these facts, the Trial Court erred when it concluded 
that M[p]laintiffs have not waived the escalation provisions with 
respect to rent and property taxes under the Lease." [Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law, fl 5]. 
The Trial Court made no Conclusion of Law regarding defendant's 
defense of estoppel. 
This Court, in Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d 
598 (1970), stated: 
An estoppel by the conduct or admissions of a 
party . . . it is, and always was, a familiar 
principle in the law of contracts. It lies 
at the foundation of morals and is a cardinal 
point in the exposition of promises, that one 
shall be bound by the state of facts which he 
has induced another to act upon, [quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary]. 
464 P.2d at 602. Under the doctrine of estoppel, one may by his 
acts or conduct away from court be prevented from denying in 
court the effect or results of those acts. Id. 
The elements necessary to invoke the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel are: 
(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the 
claim afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such 
admission/ statement or act/ and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing 
the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission/ 
statement or act. 
Celebrity Club/ Inc. v« Utah Liquor Control Commission/ 602 P.2d 
689/ 694 (Utah 1979). 
All of the elements of an equitable estoppel are present 
in the case at bar. The acceptance by the Estate of Jacqueline 
Barnes and the Partnership of the sum of $lf000.0 per month in 
payment of Fernwoods' rental obligation for a period of over two 
and one-half years is patently inconsistent with the Partner-
ship's subsequent claim for arrearages in rent during that period 
and with its claim that the escalation provisions of Paragraph 3 
of the Lease Agreement were not modified by the Hintze letter of 
January 23/ 1980. "The test of estoppel is objective in nature 
as to what a reasonable person, under the circumstances/ might 
conclude.w Big Butte Ranch/ Inc. v. Holmy 570 P.2d 690, 691 
(Utah 1977). A reasonable person in the position of Fernwoods 
could only conclude that Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement had 
been modified to provide for a fixed rental amount in the sum of 
$1,000.00 per month for the balance of the lease term. 
This Court has consistently held that a course of dealing 
between parties may work an estoppel. Thus, in Dixon v. Stoddard, 
627 P.2d 83 (Utah 1981), this Court held that where the makers of 
a promissory note made payments on the note for a period of seven 
years, they were thereafter estopped from asserting the defense 
of fraud in an action brought by the holders of the note to collect 
the balance due and owing. A similar holding was reached by the 
Court in Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975), 
wherein the Court held that where the plaintiffs, for over four 
years, had dealt with the defendant as if the defendant were the 
plaintiffs' lessee, the plaintiffs were estopped to take the 
inconsistent position that the defendant did not have a leasehold 
interest. 
The second element of equitable estoppel is also present 
in the instant case. Hintze's letter of March 24, 1980, provided: 
We would be willing to advertise the Palace 
for rent and obtain a tenant for your space 
and, providing that we are able to obtain a 
substitute leasee [sic] on the same terms as 
your lease, we would hold you responsible 
only for the cost of leasing and the rent 
until the new tenant takes possession of the 
building. Otherwise, we would expect full 
compliance with the lease agreement as modi-
fied by our January 25 [sic], 1980 letter. 
[Addendum ,fFM; Ex. 13] (Emphasis added). On the basis of 
the Hintze letters of January 23, 1980 and March 24, 1980, and 
the acceptance by the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the Part-
nership of rental payments in the sum of $1,000.00 per month, 
Fernwoods did not abandon the leased premises; rather, it paid 
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the sum of $1,000.00 per month in rent for over two and one-half 
years, believing that the payment of $1,000.00 per month dis-
charged in full its rental obligation under the lease. 
Finally, the third element of equitable estoppel is 
present in the case at bar. To allow the Partnership to con-
tradict or repudiate the Hintze letters and the effect of its 
acceptance of the $1,000.00 per month rental payments clearly 
works an injury to Fernwoods and is patently unjust. It cannot 
seriously be contended that a Judgment for arrearages in rent, 
including prejudgment interest, in the sum of $13,072.77 is not 
injurious to Fernwoods. [Judgment, fl 1] . Moreover, it belies 
reason to contend that a judgment for back rent under the parking 
lot sublease in the sum of $4,718.82, including prejudgment 
interest, does not constitute an injury to Fernwoods. [Judgment, 
1[ 2]. For Fernwoods to agree to stay in the leased premises and 
pay the sum of $1,000.00 per month, an increase of approximately 
$200.00 per month over what it had previously been paying, in 
reliance upon Hintze1s letters, and then to allow the Partnership 
to repudiate their acceptance of the $1,000.00 per month pay-
ments, clearly works an injustice on Fernwoods. 
All of the elements of an equitable estoppel are present 
in the case at bar. This Honorable Court should therefore hold 
that the Partnership is estopped from bringing its claim for 
past rent allegedly due and owing under the provisions of Para-
graph 3 of the Lease Agreement and for rent allegedly due and 
owing under the parking lot sublease under paragraph 10 of the 
Lease Agreement. 
Moreover, the sum of $1,000.00 per month having been paid 
by Fernwoods and accepted by the Partnership and its predecessor 
in interest, renders the modification executed or constitutes an 
executed gift or waiver of the excess, thereby precluding the 
Partnership from thereafter recovering additional sums for those 
periods in which there was an unqualified acceptance of the 
$1,000.00. 
In Josephine and Anthony Corp. v. Horwitz, 58 A.D. 2d 
643, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 53 (1977), the defendant had borrowed certain 
funds from the plaintiff corporation. Part payment was made, 
resulting in a balance due of $8,950.00. Defendant thereafter 
offered plaintiffs a "stipulation" with terms, although no 
action was pending. The plaintiffs did not sign the stipulation 
as tendered, but modified it. By his attorney's letter, the 
defendant rejected the agreement as modified and renewed the 
original offer. A check for $75.00, the first payment called for 
in the original stipulation, was enclosed with that letter. The 
plaintiffs never replied, but cashed the check and the 18 checks 
subsequently tendered pursuant to the renewed offer. The defen-
dant, after tendering 19 checks, ceased payment and the plain-
tiffs commenced an action, contending that no agreement had ever 
been entered into and seeking the remaining principal due, with 
interest from the date of the original loan. The court held that 
the parties had entered into a binding agreement and, therefore, 
that interest was to be computed from the date of default on the 
stipulated agreement, rather than from the original borrowing 
date. In so holding, the court stated: 
- 34 -
While silence, of itself, is not an accep-
tance absent a duty to speak, "[a] duty to 
speak is imperative as a matter of law where 
conduct, accompanied by silence, would be 
deceptive and beguiling" (Brennan v. Nation-
al Equit. Inv. Co,, 247 N.Y. 486, 490, 160 
N.E. 924, 925). When the plaintiffs cashed 
the checks, an acceptance of the renewed 
offer was indicated by their conduct. 
396 N.Y.S. 2d at 54. 
So too, in the case at bar, acceptance by the Partnership 
of rent payment checks in the sum of $1,000.00 per month constituted 
an acceptance by the Partnership of the modification to the Lease 
Agreement providing for the payment of $1,000.00 per month rent. 
In Perry v. Farmer, 47 Ariz. 185, 54 P.2d 999 (1936), the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that where a landlord had agreed to 
accept a lesser rent than that set forth in a lease and had 
accepted the reduced rent as full payment for a period of time, 
the landlord could not thereafter claim that the rent had not 
been fully paid for that period, nor recover the difference 
between the rent so paid and the rent stipulated in the lease. 
The court pointed out that where the modifying agreement had been 
fully or partially executed on both sides, neither party could 
repudiate that part which had been executed. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Baier v. Smith, 120 
Conn. 568, 181 A. 618 (1935), held that where a landlord had 
accepted a lesser amount of rent, in accordance with an oral 
agreement, he could not thereafter recover the balance of the 
full amount of rent. While accepting the proposition that 
consideration would be necessary to support the agreement for the 
reduction in rent while it remained executory, the court stated 
that where the agreement had been executed as to payments which 
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had fallen due and been paid, the rule requiring consideration 
had no application. 
A similar holding was reached in Hawkins Hardware Co. v, 
Crews, 176 Miss. 434, 169 So. 767 (1936), wherein the court held 
that a landlord could not recover the full amount of the rent due 
under the original lease where the evidence showed that a smaller 
sum had been accepted for an eleven-month period without comment 
or disavowal of any kind. 
In Haun v. Corkland, 55 Tenn. App. 292, 399 S.W. 2d 518 
(1965), the court determined that there was consideration to 
support a rental reduction agreement. The court further stated, 
however, that even if it were mistaken in holding that there was 
consideration for the agreement to reduce rent, the general rule 
was that where the agreement to reduce rent has been fully exe-
cuted and the smaller sum of rent paid and accepted in full dur-
ing the term of the lease, no formal consideration is necessary. 
In summary, the Partnership is precluded by the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel from bringing this action for alleged 
arrearages in rent due on the leased building and surrounding 
parking lot. The Trial Court's Finding of Pact that " [defen-
dants were not prejudiced by any delay in Plaintiffs1 making of 
the claim for arrearages in rents and taxes," [Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact, 11 20], is not 
supported by the evidence. At a minimum, the Partnership, having 
accepted without complaint rental payments in the sum of $1,000.00 
per month, is precluded from recovering arrearages in rent for 
the period between February, 1980 and October 1, 1982. Para-
graphs 1 and 2 of the Judgment must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY REWROTE THE 
PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT AND AWARDED DAMAGES THEREON, 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement provides that "the 
monthly rent shall be adjusted upward or downward based upon 
the United States Cost of Living Index using 1976 as a base, 
provided that the index must rise or fall 5% from the base or 
prior adjusted level before adjustments in the rent are made." 
(Emphasis added). The Lease Agreement was drafted and prepared 
by Raymond Hintze, counsel for Jacqueline Barnes. [R. 374, 520]. 
The language and terms used therein were Hintze's. [R. 374]. 
The use of the "United States Cost of Living Index" to determine 
escalations in the monthly rental amount due under the Lease was 
the decision of Hintze and Jacqueline Barnes. [R. 520]. 
Richard Wood conducted the negotiations on behalf of 
Fernwoods and was not represented by counsel. [R. 581]. At the 
time the Lease Agreement was executed, Wood had no independent 
knowledge of the existence or non-existence of the United States 
Cost of Living Index and simply acquiesced to the request of 
Jacqueline Barnes and Raymond Hintze that that specific Index be 
utilized to determine increases or decreases in rent under 
Paragraph 3 of the lease. [R. 520]. 
No discussions were held during the negotiations leading 
to the execution of the Lease Agreement concerning the use of the 
"Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers" Index for the 
purpose of determining increases or decreases in rent under the 
provisions of Paragraph 3. In addition, no discussions were held 
regarding utilizing regional indexes, as opposed to a national 
index, or whether regional indexes were, in fact, available for 
use in determining adjustments to the rental obligation. More-
over, no discussions were held concerning the availability of 
index subcategories for determining increases or decreases in 
rent. [R. 522, 578]. 
When the Trial Court determined that no index entitled 
"United States Cost of Living Index" existed, it allowed into 
evidence, over the repeated objections of defense counsel, 
testimony and Exhibit 16 concerning increases in the "Consumer 
Price Index - All Urban Consumers - U.S. City Average." Based 
upon increases in the Consumer Price Index, the Trial Court 
awarded the Partnership damages for arrearages in rent. The 
Trial Court further held that future increases in the Consumer 
Price Index would be applied to the rent provided for in Para-
graph 3 of the Lease Agreement. In so holding, the Trial Court 
impermissibly rewrote or "reformed" the Lease Agreement to 
incorporate a provision neither contemplated, nor agreed to, by 
Fernwoods. 
Justice Zimmerman, writing for a unanimous Court in 
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984), stated 
that "[a] court does not have carte blanche to reform any trans-
action to include terms that it believes are fair. Its dis-
cretion is narrowly bounded." Indeed, it is a fundamental 
precept of contract law that courts cannot, and ought not, 
make a contract for the parties which they did not make for 
themselves or impose upon a party an obligation which was not 
assumed. See, e.g., Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, 
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Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Isaak v. Massachussets Indem. 
Life Ins. Co., 127 Ariz. 581, 623 P.2d 11 (1981); Herrin v. 
Herrin, 182 Mont. 142, 595 P.2d 1152 (1979); Puget Sound Power & 
Light Co. v. Shulman, 84 Wash. 2d 433, 526 P.2d 1210 (1974). 
The term "United States Cost of Living Index," is 
not ambiguous. Therefore, the rules of construction relating to 
the interpretation of ambiguous contracts are not applicable. 
The Partnership and Fernwoods are governed by the language of the 
Lease Agreement. Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., Inc., 
603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). The Trial Court found that "[t]he 
'United States Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers1 
released by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, fairly comports with the intent and meaning of 
the parties with respect to escalations in the base rent under 
the Lease Agreement." [Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Findings of Fact, 11 7]. If the provisions of Paragraph 3 
of the Lease Agreement were ambiguous, an attempt by the Trial 
Court to interpret its langauge and to find a meaning which 
"fairly comported" with the intent of the parties would be 
appropriate. However, the term "United States Cost of Living 
Index" is unambiguous. To substitute another measurement for 
the non-existent United States Cost of Living Index is an imper-
missible interpretation of an unambiguous provision. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that 
"[b]y mutual agreement and understanding of the parties, the 
'Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers' prepared by the 
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics is 
the standard upon which escalations in the base rent were to be 
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made under the 1976 Lease," [Amended Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law, Conclusions of Law, 1f 8] is simply not supported 
by any evidence in the record. The parties agreed to the use 
of the "United States Cost of Living Index" in the 1976 Lease 
Agreement. The use of the Consumer Price Index was not discussed. 
In an attempt to buttress its unwarranted conclusion that 
the parties had agreed to escalations in the Lease Agreement 
based upon the Consumer Price Index, the Trial Court made the 
following Findings of Fact: 
8. In calculating the increases in the rent 
under paragraph 3 of the Lease, Jacqueline C. 
Barnes' attorney, Raymond A. Hintze, used the 
"Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers" 
released by the United States Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and com-
monly used in commercial leases. 
* * * 
10. Neither defendants nor their attorney 
questioned the method by which escalations 
in rent were computed based on the "Con-
sumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers" 
index, nor did they object to the use of 
the index. 
11. Defendant consented to and immediately 
began paying the increased rent for Septem-
ber 1, 1979 of $960.00 based on the increases 
in the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Con-
sumers" and $100.00 for the parking lot lease. 
Finding of Fact No. 8 is based upon the calculations set forth 
in the Hintze letter of September 6, 1979. [Addendum "D"]. In 
that letter, Hintze stated, in pertinent part: 
As you are aware, the lease we negotiated 
for the Fernwood Palace and Jackie Barnes 
in August, 1976, calls for periodic adjust-
ments based upon the cost of living increases. 
There has been each year a substantial in-
crease in the cost of living which has ex-
ceeded the 5% minimum required by the lease. 
. . . We have obtained the cost of living 
- an -
figures from the United States government 
and find that a 6.8% increased [sic] oc-
curred from 1976 to 1977, a 9.0% increase 
for 1978 and a [sic] 11.3% increase for 
1979. The index has increased from 1976 
level of 171.1 to the present level of 218.9 
which is a 27.9% increase. Applying this to 
the base amount of $750, the base rent for 
the Palace, effective September 1, 1979, 
is $960. 
(Emphasis added). The Hintze letter of September 6, 1979, does 
not indicate that his calculations were based upon the 
"Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers" Index. At the time 
of trial, Hintze did not testify that he used the Consumer Price 
Index in arriving at the figures set forth in the September 6, 
1979 letter. Rather, Mark Papanikolas, an accountant at Fox & 
Company, an expert witness retained by the Partnership, testified 
that the figures set forth in Hintze's letter of September 6, 
1979, corresponded to the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban 
Consumers - CPI-U" Index. [R. 507-510]. 
It is true that, subsequent to receiving the Hintze 
letter of September 6, 1979, Fernwoods began paying the sum 
of $1,060.00 per month as rent for the building and surrounding 
parking lot. However, to find from that fact alone that "neither 
the defendants nor their attorney questioned the method by which 
escalations in rent were computed based on the 'Consumer Price 
Index - All Urban Consumers' index, nor did they object to the 
use of the index," and that the "[d]efendant consented to and 
immediately began paying the increased rent for September 1, 
1979 of $960.00 based upon the increases in the 'Consumer Price 
Index - All Urban Consumers' is an unwarranted and unjustified 
interpretation of the facts. There is no evidence in the record 
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to support any Finding that Richard Wood or Fernwoods knew that 
the increase in rent requested in the September 6, 1979 letter 
from Hintze was based upon an increase in the Consumer Price 
Index, as opposed to the United States Cost of Living Index 
called for by the Lease Agreement. Not only are the trial 
court's Findings not supported by any substantial evidence, they 
are not supported by any evidence whatsoever. 
In Seattle-First National Bank v. Earl, 17 Wash. App. 
830, 565 P.2d 1215 (1977), the issue before the court was the 
effect to be given a rent escalation clause contained in a 
long-term lease where the index necessary to effectuate the 
escalation did not exist. In 1958, a trustor placed certain real 
property in a living trust. The Seattle-First National Bank, 
along with other individuals, was named as co-trustee for 
the beneficiaries. The property conveyed to the trust was leased 
to certain businesses. During the negotiation of the lease, one 
of the issues was whether to include a rent escalation clause. 
The trustees suggested that a cost of living index for the City 
of Spokane be utilized. The lease was prepared by the trustees' 
attorney and approved by numerous representatives of the trustee 
Bank before submission to the lessees for signature. The lessees 
acquiesced in the trustees' recommendation for the use of "cost-
of-living figures for the City of Spokane, issued by the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics" for the purpose of determining 
escalations in the rent due under the lease. The lessees had 
no independent knowledge of the non-existence of cost of living 
figures for the City of Spokane, and accepted the recommendation 
of the trustees' representative. The court, after determining 
that the lease accurately reflected the agreement of the parties 
and that the language "cost-of-living figures for the City of 
Spokane" was not ambiguous, held that the non-existence of the 
index upon which the parties had agreed caused the escalation 
clause to be unenforceable. 
So too, in the case at bar, the escalation provision set 
forth in Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement is unenforceable. 
The provisions of Paragraph 3 must be construed against the 
Partnership's predecessors in interest and the Partnership. 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); Guinand v. Walton, 
22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969). This Court must conclude, 
as did the Washington Court of Appeals, that the non-existence of 
the "United States Cost of Living Index" causes the escalation 
clause to be unenforceable. 
Moreover, even if the Lease Agreement had provided that 
increases were to be calculated on the basis of the Consumer 
Price Index, Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement would nonetheless 
be unenforceable. The Consumer Price Index has two major 
categories, "All Urban Consumers, CPI-U," and "Urban Wage Earners 
and Clerical Workers, CPI-W." [R. 465; Ex. 22]. In addition, 
each of these major categories are divided into various geograph-
ical areas, including the "U.S. City Average." [R. 462]. These 
categories are additionally subdivided into subcategories con-
sisting of "All Items," "Food and Beverages," "Housing," "Apparel 
and Upkeep," "Transportation," "Medical Care," "Entertainment," 
and "Other Goods and Services." [See generally Addendum "I"; 
Ex. 22]. 
In Johnston v. First National Bank & Trust Company of 
Joplin, 624 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. App. 1981), at issue was an increase 
in rent sought by the defendant lessor pursuant to a Consumer 
Price Index provision in various leases. The plaintiffs were 
lessees of the lessor. The lessees brought a declaratory judg-
ment action, contending that the Consumer Price Index escalation 
provision was unenforceable because it was indefinite. The trial 
court found that the provision was unenforceable because it did 
not state which category of the Consumer Price Index was to be 
used as a basis for the rental increase. The defendant landlord 
appealed. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in holding the escalation 
provision to be unenforceable, stated: 
The wording here does not provide a situa-
tion where one of two constructions must have 
been intended by the parties. There are mul-
tiple choices. Nor is it a situation where 
the agreement can be most favorably construed 
against the drafting party as there is no way 
to tell from year to year what may be most 
favorable because of fluctuations in the 
various months and categories of the Consumer 
Price Index. 
* * * 
Any method of determining an increase in rent 
under the Consumer Price Index provision that 
we declare to be proper would create obliga-
tions upon the parties that were not agreed 
to nor necessarily implied from the language 
in the lease or from the parties' conduct. 
It would be pure speculation whether such 
method was intended by any party, by the 
language of the lease, or whether the par-
ties would have agreed to such a method had 
they considered it. We hold that the provi-
sion regarding the Consumer Price Index is 
ineffective and that the rent cannot be in-
creased based on that provision. 
Id. at 503, 504. 
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In the case at bar, had the Lease Agreement provided for 
increases in rent based upon increases in the Consumer Price 
Index, it would, nonetheless, not be enforceable. As the 
Missouri Court of Appeals stated, any method of determining the 
increase would necessarily create obligations upon the parties 
that were not agreed to or implied from the language of the Lease 
Agreement. 
The Trial Court, in awarding damages based upon increases 
in the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, CPI-U" Index 
created obligations not agreed to or intended by the parties. 
The provisions of the Lease Agreement are unambiguous on their 
face and, accordingly, the parties are bound by the provisions 
therein. The fact that the United States Cost of Living Index 
does not exist may be unfortunate, but the Partnership is bound 
by the provisions of the Lease. To allow the Trial Court to 
rewrite the provisions of the Lease Agreement to include provi-
sions which it deems fair is to give carte blanche to all courts 
to delete provisions or modify contracts based upon an amorphous 
concept of "fairness.11 
This Court must reverse the Trial Court's Judgment 
insofar as it awards arrearages in rent based upon increases in 
the Consumer Price Index, provides that rent escalations under 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement are to be determined, in the 
future, upon fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index, and 
establishes a current monthly rental amount due on the leased 
premises based upon increases in the Consumer Price Index. 
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POINT IV 
THE PARTNERSHIP FAILED TO MEET THE CONDI-
TION PRECEDENT TO AN AWARD FOR INCREASES 
IN PROPERTY TAXES. 
Paragraph 4 of the Lease Agreement provides, in pertinent 
part: 
The Lessor shall pay the said property taxes 
annually, and in the event the said taxes 
shall increase in any year in excess of the 
5% as provided above, 75% of such increase 
shall be due the Lessor from the Lessee 
upon proof of payment of the same . . . 
[Addendum "C"] (Emphasis added). 
Words such as "upon the happening of such event" or 
similar language usually connote an intent for a condition rather 
than a promise. See, e.g., Hohenberg Brothers Company v. George 
E. Gibbons & Company, 537 S.W. 2d 1 (Tex. 1976); Kosberg v. 
Brown, 601 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Paragraph 4 of the 
Lease Agreement clearly sets forth a condition precedent to any 
obligation of Fernwoods to pay 75% of any increase in property 
taxes over the 1976 base, to wit: the tender of proof of payment 
by the Partnership of any increase in property taxes. 
Prior to trial, the Partnership had not tendered any 
proof of payment by the Partnership of increases in property 
taxes on the leased premises. [R. 414, 430, 605]. Notwithstand-
ing the objections of defense counsel [R. 348, 349, 350, 353], 
the Trial Court allowed the Partnership, for the first time, to 
present proof during trial of payment by the Partnership of 
increases in property taxes. [Ex. 6; R. 348-353]. While the 
Trial Court stated that it was accepting Exhibit 6 only for the 
purpose of showing the amount of taxes that had been paid, 
and not as "proof of tender to the defendant or a submission to 
him of the amount of taxes that have been paid" [R. 349], 
the Trial Court gave judgment to plaintiffs for 75% of the 
increase in property taxes over the 1976 base from 1980 through 
1983, including prejudgment interest. [Judgment, 1( 3]. The 
Judgment of the trial court is clearly in error and must be 
reversed. 
As this Court stated in Ephraim Theatre Company v. 
Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958): 
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, 
nor the court has any right to ignore or 
modify conditions which are clearly expres-
sed merely because it may subject one of 
the parties to hardship, but they must be 
enforced "in accordance with the intention 
as . . . manifested by the language used 
by the parties to the contract." [Cita-
tions omitted.] 
321 P.2d at 223. In Ephraim Theatre Company, plaintiff corpora-
tion owned the Ephraim Theatre in Ephraim, Utah. The parties 
entered into a contract for a joint venture whereby the defen-
dants, who were the theater operators, were to manage and operate 
the theater and the plaintiff was to furnish the building. 
The lease for the building, executed by the parties, delineated 
how the proceeds from the operation of the theater were to be 
applied: first, to cover all operating expenses, enumerating 
them; second, to pay the rent to the plaintiff; and finally, 
to divide the balance equally. The theater business was not as 
good as the parties had anticipated. Indeed, the expenses 
on the building did not allow for the payment of rent. Not-
withstanding this fact, plaintiff brought suit alleging that 
the parties had agreed to a minimum monthly rental of $125.00 
_ A n — 
per month. This Court, in reversing the decision of the trial 
court that the defendant was to pay a minimum monthly rental 
amount, held that the payment of any rent was specifically 
conditional upon there being excess funds after the payment of 
operational expenses. 
In the case at bar the obligation of Fernwoods to pay 
75% of any increase in property taxes over the 1976 level was 
expressly conditioned upon the tender to Fernwoods of proof of 
payment by the Partnership of increases in property taxes. By 
reason of the failure of the Partnership to furnish such proof of 
payment prior to trial, the Partnership's action for 75% of the 
increase in property taxes over the 1976 level is expressly 
barred by the terms of the Lease Agreement. 
Dispositive of this issue is the decision of the Colorado 
Court of Appeals in N.R. Nielsen and Son, Inc. v. Myrick, Criswell, 
Branney, 527 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1974). An action was brought 
by a contractor against certain building owners to recover the 
final payment allegedly due under a contract for remodeling the 
building. Article 9.7.3 of the contract provided: 
Neither the final payment nor the remaining 
retained percentage shall become due until 
the contractor submits to the architect (1) 
an Affidavit that all payrolls, bills for 
materials and equipment, and other indebted-
ness connected with the work for which the 
owner or his property might in any way be 
responsible, have been paid or otherwise 
satisfied . . . . 
The building owners defended against the contractor's action on 
the ground that the contractor had not submitted the required 
Affidavit to the architect and had therefore not met the condi-
tion precedent to receiving final payment. The trial court 
- 48 -
granted judgment for the defendant building owners and the 
contractor appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the trial court holding that "the trial court's 
ruling that the Affidavit requirement is a condition precedent 
is consistent with the intent of the parties as expressed in 
the contract, read as a whole." Id. at 938. 
In the case at bar, the obligation of Fernwoods to 
pay 75% of any increase in property taxes over the 1976 level 
is expressly conditioned upon presentment by the Partnership 
of proof of payment by the Partnership of the increase in prop-
erty taxes. Accordingly, as this Court held in Ephraim Theatre 
Company v. Hawk/ supra, and as the Colorado Court of Appeals 
held in N.R. Nielsen and Son, Contractors, Inc. v. Myrick, 
Criswell, Branney, supra, the failure of the Partnership to 
tender proof of payment of the increase in property taxes to 
Fernwoods bars the Partnership's action for any increases in 
property taxes. The Judgment must be reversed insofar as it 
awards the Partnership damages for increases in property taxes 
on the leased premises. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE A SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENTIARY BASIS UPON WHICH TO AWARD THE 
PARTNERSHIP ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
In Utah, attorneys' fees cannot be recovered unless pro-
vided for by statute or contract. See, e.g., B&R Supply Co. v. 
Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972). Paragraph 14 
of the Lease Agreement provides: 
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The Lessor and the Lessee each agree that 
should they default in any of the covenants 
or agreements contained herein, that the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee which may arise or accrue from enforc-
ing this agreement, whether such enforce-
ment is pursued by filing of a suit or 
otherwise. 
[Addendum "C"]. Attorneys1 fees and costs can be awarded pur-
suant to Paragraph 14 of the Lease Agreement only in the amount 
necessary to enforce the provisions of the Agreement. Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). 
The actual amount of attorneys1 fees awarded, if any, rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. 
On August 30, 1984, the Trial Court entered its Minute 
Ruling concerning the trial of this action. [R. 227]. In 
accordance with the stipulation of counsel, counsel for the 
Partnership filed an Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. [Addendum "J" 
hereto; R. 256-257]. In his Affidavit, counsel for the Partner-
ship represented that the attorneys1 fees expended totaled the 
sum of $9,850.00 and costs were incurred in the sum of $526.34, a 
sum which included a $50.00 jury fee. Prior to the time of 
trial, the Partnership had waived its demand for a jury. 
Plaintiffs proceeded to trial on two causes of action, 
one for breach of the Lease Agreement and one for fraud on the 
part of defendant Wood. Both parties in this litigation were 
seeking to enforce the Lease Agreement, and each party was 
partially successful. Because the Partnership claimed that the 
Lease Agreement was breached, defendant Wood was constrained to 
prove the Lease Agreement had been modified and, consequently, 
that the Partnership's attempts to extract arrearages and in-
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creased rentals was wrongful. The Trial Court's ruling that the 
Lease Agreement was modified, but that the modification extended 
only to the base rental amountf sustained/ in part, the position 
of each party. Moreover, the Trial Court rejected the Partner-
ship's allegation of fraud on the part of defendant Wood. 
The Partnership's original Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees 
[Addendum "J"] , and the Affidavit of Richard D. Burbidge in 
Opposition to Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs [Addendum "K" hereto; R. 277-279]f 
failed to segregate the portion of the total fees expended to 
enforce the modified Lease Agreement from the total fees expended 
to enforce Lease Agreement as unmodified and to assert the 
Partnership's fraud claims. The original Affidavit of Attorneys' 
Fees merely set forth the total number of hours expended by the 
Partnership's counsel, his associate and his law clerk on the 
entire case. An averment of the gross number of hours expended 
on an entire case is inadequate to support an award of attorneys' 
fees in a multiple issue case where the party claiming the 
attorneys' fees prevails on some, but not all, of the issues. 
In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978), attorneys' 
fees were disallowed based upon defendant's counsel's testimony 
that although he had expended in excess of fifty-six hours in 
defense of plaintiffs' claims and the prosecution of defendant's 
counterclaims, he "had no idea" what portion of the time was 
attributable to the assertion of defendant's counterclaim for the 
collection of certain promissory notes. The promissory notes 
provided that the plaintiff agreed to pay all costs of collec-
tion, including reasonable attorney's fees. Td. at 603. This 
Court held that the contractual liability for the payment of 
attorneys' fees extended only to the amount necessary for collec-
tion of the promissory notes and, therefore, an award of attor-
neys' fees was improper in light of the inability of the defen-
dant's counsel to segregate the time spent on each of the issues 
of the case* 
On October 15, 1984, the Trial Court executed a certain 
Minute Entry which provided: 
It is the opinion of the Court that the fraud 
claim upon which Plaintiffs did not prevail 
and the prosecution of that theory reasonably 
involved one-third of the time of plaintiff's 
[sic] counsel. The amount claimed for attor-
neys fees is therefore decreased by one-third. 
The objection to the claim for jury fee is 
sustained. 
[Addendum "L" hereto; R. 285]. The Judgment entered by the Trial 
Court on November 6, 1984, awarded the Partnership $6,566.66 
for attorneys' fees. [Judgment, 1[ 4]. The Trial Court's award 
of attorneys' fees was not based upon any additional evidence 
specifically delineating the time spent in enforcing the Lease 
Agreement as modified, as opposed to the Partnership's seeking 
to enforce the unmodified Lease Agreement or in prosecuting the 
Partnership's fraud claims. 
While it has long been this Court's policy to accord 
great deference to the discretionary conclusions of a trial court 
regarding attorneys' fees, Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982), " [i]t is well established 
that to justify a finding of a reasonable attorney's fee, 
there must be evidence in support of that finding." Mason v. 
Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730, 733 (1945). This Court has 
- 52 -
held that an apportionment of attorneyfs fees, without adequate 
evidence to support it, constitutes an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court and must be overruled. Paul Mueller Company v. Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982). 
The Partnership may be awarded attorneys' fees only on those 
billable hours attributable to the Partnership's enforcement of 
the Lease Agreement as found to be modified by the trial Court. 
Id. at 1288. No competent evidence was before the Trial Court 
regarding those billable hours attributable only to the enforce-
ment of the Lease Agreement as modified. Accordingly, the Trial 
Court abused its discretion in awarding the Partnership attor-
neys' fees in the sum of $6,566.66. 
CONCLUSION 
This Honorable Court should reverse the Judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, entered on the Judgment Roll on November 6, 1984 in the 
following particulars: 
1. Paragraph 1 of the Judgment awarding the Partnership 
$13,072.77 in rental arrearages, fixing the monthly rental 
payment as of September 1, 1983, at $1,191.86, adjudging that 
escalations shall apply to the monthly rent under Paragraph 3 of 
the Lease Agreement, and that the back rent awarded and future 
escalations in rent be computed on the basis of the "Consumer 
Price Index - All Urban Consumers." 
2. Paragraph 2 of the Judgment awarding the Partnership 
judgment for back rent on the parking lot sublease in the sum of 
$4,718.82 and further declaring that "the monthly parking lot 
rent from and after September 1, 1983 shall be Seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the Lease rate charged to plaintiffs.w 
3. Paragraph 3 of the Judgment awarding the Partnership 
the sum of $1,081.05, including prejudgment interest, for in-
creases in property taxes from September, 1980, to and including 
September, 1983. 
4. Paragraph 4 of the Judgment awarding the partnership 
attorneys1 fees in the sum of $6,566.66. 
In addition, this Court should award Appellant the costs 
incurred in prosecuting this Appeal. See Rule 34, U.R.A.P. 
DATED this 3rd. 
day of June, 1985. 
Jy/MICHAEL HANSEN, Esq. 
SCOTT F. Y, 
of and 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Richard C. Wood, d/b/a 
Fernwood Candy & Ice Cream 
Company 
- C;A _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant Richard C. Wood, 
d/b/a Fernwood Candy & Ice Cream Company, were hand-delivered 
this 3rd day of June, 1985, to: 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
of and for 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM "A" 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Richard D.'Burbidge, #0492 Salt Lake County Utah 
Stephen B. Mitchell, #2278 . . . . . 
BURBIDGE AND MITCHELL NOV 5 1984 
Attorneys for 
2001 Elks Building W ^ o n H , n ^ 5 ^ 3 r d D j r - C o u r t 
139 East South Temple &- f fJ ' • / vW" 7 » fc£L a < f > 
i Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1
 Telephone: (801) 355-6677 
:
 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
' STATE OF UTAH 
! ROBERT W. BARNES, et a l . 
I 
I Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. WOOD, et a l . , 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C 83-498 
James S. Sawaya, Judge 
This matter came on regularly for t r ia l to the Court on August 14, 15 
and 16, 1984, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. Plaintiffs were 
represented by their counsel, Richard D. Burbidge, Esq., of Burbidge and 
Mitchell, and defendants were represented by their counsel, J. Michael Hansen, i 
J Esq., of Suitter, Axland, Annstrong & Hanson. The Court having fully heard 
;' i 
I the evidence presented and the matter having been submitted by the parties, 
l
' and the Court being fully advised in the premises and having entered its i 
i | Memorandum Decision, the Court hereby makes the following: 
j FINDINGS OF FACT 
I-
! 1. On or about September 1 , 1976, Jacqueline C. Barnes, plaintiffs1 
! predecessor in interest, and the defendants entered into a written lease 
i agreement with respect to real and personal property located at 3364 South 
i 
. 2300 East, known as the Palace Ice Cream Store, for a term of ten (10) years. 
2. Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides for a minimum guaranteed rental 
i of $750.00 each month with adjustments to be made upward or downward based 
upon the United States Cost of Living Index using August, 1976 as a base, 
provided that the Index rises or falls 5% from the base or prior adjusted 
| level. In using the quoted language, the parties intended that adjustments to 
|, the $750.00 base rent would be made based on the increase or decrease in the j 
j- cost of living applicable to the U.S. as a whole, and not excluding any j 
h I 
|! specific items. j 
I 
; 3. Paragraph 10 of the Lease further provides that defendants shall 
! sublet from Jacqueline C. Barnes a certain parking lot adjacent to the Palace 
Ice Cream Store. 
4. By long-standing agreement between the parties, defendants agreed 
to pay 75$ of the monthly rental under the parking lot lease. 
j 5. Under paragraph 4 of the Lease defendants further covenanted and 
I! agreed to pay 75% of increases in the general property taxes upon the Palace | 
i Ice Cream Store which are more than 5% in excess of the taxes for the year 
I 1976. | 
j! 6. On or about September 6, 1979, Jacqueline C. Barnes1 attorney, j 
jj Raymond A. Hintze, informed defendants that pursuant to paragraph 3 of the j 
I; Lease defendants1 monthly rent effective September 1, 1979 would be increased J 
H " j 
to $960.00, and in addition, the parking lot lease had increased to $200.00 I 
i: 
i per month and defendants were requested to pay their share which he mistakenly1 
!i ! 
;, informed them amounted to $100.00 per month. Finally, defendants were j 
|! ' 
: requested to pay the increase in the property taxes on the Palace Ice Cream j 
!! ! 
Store for the years 1977 and 1978 which were 5% over the 1976 base tax. ! 
7. The "United States Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers" 
released by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,: 
fairly comports with the intent and meaning of the parties with respect to | 
escalations in the base rent under the Lease Agreement. 
8. In calculating the increases in the rent under paragraph 3 of the 
Lease, Jacqueline C. Barnes1 attorney, Raymond A. Hintze, used the "Consumer 
Price Index—All Urban Consumers" released by the United States Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statist ics , and commonly used in commercial leases. I 
9. Neither the defendants nor their attorney, Gaylen S. Young, j 
questioned the increases in the rent, parking lot lease and property taxes 
made by Jacqueline C. Barnes. 
10. Neither defendants nor their attorney questioned the method by 
which escalations in rent were computed based on the "Consumer Price 
Index—All Urban Consumers" index, nor did they object to the use of the index.' 
11. Defendant consented to and immediately began paying the increased J 
rent for September 1, 1979 of $960.00 based on the increases in the "Consumer j 
Price Index—All Urban Consumers" and $100.00 for the parking lot lease. [ 
12. Defendants knew that the demand on defendants by Jacqueline 
Barnes1 attorney for 50% of the monthly parking lot rental was in error and 
contrary to the agreement between the parties. However, defendants did not j 
I 
communicate the error to Jacqueline Barnes or anyone representing her. j 
13. Pursuant to the Lease Agreement between the parties, Jacqueline J 
Barnes was entitled to receive 75% of the increased parking lot rental, which, 
after September 1, 1979 amounted to $150.00, and which after September 1, ; 
1983, amounted to $200.00. j 
14. On or about December 5, 1979, defendants, through their attorney 
i 
Gaylen S. Young, initiated negotiations for the reduction in the base rent and 
reduction in the property tax increases. Defendants offered to reduce the 
base rent to $900.00 per month and to pay all increases in property taxes over 
J the 1979 base. 
I 15. On or about January 17, 1980, Jacqueline C. Barnes was killed. 
16. On or about January 23, 1980, Jacqueline C. Barnes personal 
representative accepted defendants1 proposal to reduce the base rent to 
l| $900.00 per month. In addition, Jacqueline Barnes1 personal representative 
agreed to defendants1 proposal to forego her claim for the increased taxes 
I 1 
| through 1979. No agreement was requested or made concerning the escalation i 
h 
| provisions of the Lease and the $900.00 amount remained subject to the 
I escalation provisions of the Lease. 
I 17. Beginning February 1, 1980, defendants began paying $1,000.00 per 
I month constituting the $900.00 base and $100.00 for parking based on the 
I mistaken belief of counsel for plaintiffs1 predecessor that defendants were toj 
J pay one-half of the parking lot obligation. I 
18. Plaintiffs, as successors in interest, of Jacqueline C. Barnes, 
jj were given a personal representative's deed to the Palace Ice Cream Store in | 
I; January of 1981. However, plaintiffs were not aware at that time of any j 
r modification of the Lease entered into with the defendants. | 
« I 
i, 19. In the summer of 1982 plaintiffs were informed by their father of i 
jj the cost of living increase clause in paragraph 3 of the Lease and that all j 
If j |! rent due under the Lease was not being paid. Thereafter on or about October 
|i J 
12, 1982, plaintiffs sent a letter to the defendant Richard C. Wood requesting 
! back rent based on the escalation provisions and an increase in the property ! 
I ! 
i taxes for 1982. Upon refusal of the defendants to comply with plaintiffs1 
I request, the present lawsuit was initiated. j 
i! I 
20. Defendants were not prejudiced by any delay in Plaintiffs1 making 
the claim for arrearages in rents and taxes. » 
21. * With $900.00 as a base rent as of September 1, 1979, p l a i n t i f f s 1 
are ent i t led to yearly escalations in the rent pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 
Lease Agreement based on increases in the United States Consumer Price 
Index—All Urban Consumers. 
22. The difference between the rent actually paid by defendants of 
approximately $900.00 per month and the rent which defendants are obligated to 
pay under the Lease Agreement based on escalations under paragraph 3 from and 
af ter September 1 , 1979 unt i l the date of t r i a l amounts to $11,138.08, plus 
accrued interest thereon at the legal rate compounded annually for a total 
de f i c i t of $13,072.77. 
23. The difference between the monthly parking l o t sublease rental of 
$100.00 per month actually paid by defendants on the one hand and the parking 
l o t sublease rental p l a i n t i f f s are ent i t led to by agreement of the parties of 
75% of the rentals under the main Lease from September 1 , 1979 unt i l date of 
t r i a l amounts to $3,900.00 plus accrued interest thereon at the legal rate 
compounded annually for a total de f i c i t of $4,718.82. 
24. The property taxes on the Palace Ice Cream Store have increased 
since 1979 above the 1976 base with 75% of such increase to ta l l ing $912.40 
plus accrued interest thereon at the legal rate up to and including the date 
of t r i a l for a total of $1,081.05. 
25. From and af ter date of t r i a l defendants' monthly rental payment 
under the lease including escalations from the base rent of $900.00 on 
September 1, 1979 amounts to $1,191.86, plus further escalations thereon 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease. 
26. From and af ter date of t r i a l defendants1 monthly rental payment 
under the parking l o t sublease based upon the agreement of the parties that 
I defendants were to pay 15% of the parking l o t lease rentals of $300.00 per 
it 
month amounts to $225.00 per month. 
I 27. The p l a i n t i f f s pursuant to Amended Complaint f i l ed a claim of 
I fraud and prosecuted that theory at t r i a l . P la in t i f f s did not previa! on 
I the i r theory of fraud and reasonable attorneys1 fees attr ibutable to the 
|j prosecution of the claim of fraud constitute one-third of the attorneys1 fees 
ji shown to have been expended on behalf of p l a i n t i f f s , and said fees are 
i 
ij reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred by the p l a i n t i f f s in the enforcement of 
h 
i the subject contract. The parties stipulated that proof of attorneys fees 
and costs awardable under the terms of the Lease would await determination by 
the Court and would be proved up by A f f idav i t . The Court having received the 
j Af f idav i t of Attorneys1 Fees of p l a i n t i f f s , counsel hereby finds the 
! attorneys1 fees of $6,566.66 and costs of $526.34 to be reasonable. 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . The Court has ju r isd ic t ion over the parties and the subject matter 
! of th is case. 
r 2. As of February 1 , 1980 the parties had entered into a modification 
by which the base rent would be reduced to $900.00 per month to which the 
I escalation provisions of the Lease apply. 
I; 3. The modification of the parking l o t rental payments from 15% to 50%! 
I' I 
was based upon the uni lateral mistake of the p la i n t i f f s and the i r predecessors' 
! in interest which had an adverse material ef fect on the p l a i n t i f f s . ! 
j Defendants knew of the mistake, but did not convey this information to the 
] 
j ! p l a i n t i f f s and, therefore, p l a i n t i f f s are ent i t led to rescind the modification! 
of the parking l o t sublease, and defendants are obligated to pay 75% of the 
parking l o t Lease payment. 
4. As of February 1, 1980, the parties had modified the lease 
obligation with respect to increases in property taxes and p l a i n t i f f s were to 
forego any increases up to 1979 and defendants were to be responsible for any 
increases in property taxes pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Lease af ter 1979. 
5. P la in t i f f s have not waived the escalation provisions with respect 
to rent and property taxes under the Lease. 
5. P la in t i f f s have not met the i r burden of proof on the i r claim that 
the modification entered into between the parties was based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
7. Defendants have not met the i r burden of proof with respect to the i r 
al legation under the i r Counterclaim that the modification of $900.00 "base" 
rent was intended by the parties to be the rent for the remaining seven years 
of the term of the Lease Agreement and that p l a i n t i f f s have brought th is 
lawsuit in v io lat ion of the Lease Agreement and modifications thereof, and the 
defendants take nothing thereby. 
8. By mutual agreement and understanding of the parties the "Consumer 
Price Index—All Urban Consumers" prepared by the United States Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Stat is t ics is the standard upon which escalations in 
the base rent were to be made under the 1976 Lease. 
9. Defendants acquiesced in and agreed to use of the Consumer Price 
Index—All Urban Consumers for calculations of the increases in the base rent 
under the 1976 Lease. 
10. The 1976 Lease Agreement entered into between the parties cal ls 
for the escalation provisions to take effect on September 1 of each year, the 
anniversary date of the Lease. 
11. P la in t i f f s are ent i t led to Judgment against defendants on their 
claim for back rent based upon adjustments to the "Consumer Price Index—All 
Urban Consumers" using $900.00 as a base rent as of September 1, 1979. 
12. P la in t i f f s are ent i t led to Judgment against defendants on the i r 
claim for back taxes based upon increases in the real property tax af ter 1979 
over the 1976 base. 
13. P la in t i f f s are ent i t led to Judgment against defendants on the i r 
claim for back rental under the parking l o t sublease based upon the agreement 
; between the parties that defendants were to pay 75£ of the monthly parking l o t 
j 
1
 renta l . 
T4. Defendants are ent i t led to Judgment against p l a i n t i f f s on 
p l a i n t i f f s 1 Second Cause of Action for misrepresentation, no cause of act ion. 
15. Attorneys1 fees of $6,566.66 are reasonable fees incurred by the 
p l a i n t i f f s in the enforcement of the subject contract. 
16. P la in t i f f s are ent i t led to Judpent against defendants on 
defendants1 Counterclaim'for attorney's fees and costs, no cause of act ion. 
DATED t\\\%gj_ day of September, 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
iftrfnes 5. Sawaya 
D is t r i c t Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Date: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Attorney for P la in t i f f s 
*&SL k . ^ V W 
Mp)uty Ciqrk 
Date: 
J. Michael Hansen 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE 
ROBERT W. BARNES, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. WOOD, e t a l . , 
De fendan ts . 
NOV 5 1984 
ey, Ciexk 3rd Oist. Court 
Degjity Clerk 
H. Dixon Hindl l$£ pi rt 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
OF UTAH 
n-t -By - / . v f 
JUDGMENT / ? W , 
Civi l No. C 83-498 
James S. Sawaya, Judge 
Thismatter came on regularly for t r i a l to the Court on August 14, 15 i 
and 16, 1984, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, D is t r i c t Judge, presiding. j 
P la in t i f f s were represented by thei r counsel, Richard D. Burbidge, Esq., of j 
Burbidge and Mi tche l l , and defendants were represented by the i r counsel, J . 
Michael Hansen, Esq., of Sui t ter , Ax!and, Armstrong & Hanson. The parties 
have introduced evidence and have presented the matter f u l l y , and the Court 
af ter having reviewed the br iefs of the part ies, having heard a l l the evidence1 
presented in th is matter and otherwise being fu l l y advised in the premises has 
made and entered i t s Memorandum Decision and made i t s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Accordingly, i t is ordered that Judgment be entered as 
fol lows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. P la in t i f f s have Judgment against defendants on the i r F i rs t Cause 
9 P X 
I of Action for back rent based upon the escalation provisions of the Lease 
I using $900.00 as a base rent as of September 1 , 1979 with adjustments thereon 
yearly thereafter based upon the Consumer Price Index—All Urban Consumers, 
; plus interest thereon at the legal rate compounded annually, for a total 
h 
j de f i c i t of $13,072.77 up to and including the date of t r i a l . In addit ion, the 
r monthly rent as of September 1 , 1983 shall be $1,191.86, plus escalations 
I-
t| thereon pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement and the agreement of 
ll 
j! the part ies; 
|j 2. P la in t i f f s have Judgment against defendants on p la i n t i f f s 1 F i rst 
I Cause of Action for back rent under the parking l o t sublease based upon an 
agreement of the parties that defendants were to pay 75% of such parking l o t 
| lease, plus accrued interest compounded annually at the legal rate, for a 
| total of $4,718.82. In addit ion, the monthly parking l o t rent from and after 
j September 1 , 1983 shall be Seventy-five percent (75%) of the Lease rate 
jj charged to p l a i n t i f f s . 
j 3. P la in t i f f s have Judgment against defendants on p la in i f f s 1 F i rs t 
j' Cause of Action for increases in the property taxes over the 1976 base, plus 
,. accrued interest compounded annually at the legal rate, for a total of 
|j $1,081.05 up to and including 1983. In addit ion, defendants are responsible 
li 
ji for any further increases in property taxes as set forth in the Lease and by 
the agreement between the parties; 
JI 
|l 4. Plaintiffs have Judgment against defendants on plaintiffs1 First 
ji Cause of Action for attorneys1 fees of $6,566.66 and costs of $476.34. 
|! 5. Defendants have judgment against plaintiffs on plaintiffs1 Second 
i Cause of Action based upon misrepresentation, no cause of action; 
6. Plaintiffs1 have judgment against defendants on defendants' 
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Counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs, no cause of action. 
DATED this y- day of SLpluihu1, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: f 
j^afes S. Sawaya 
^District Judge 
ATTEST 
H DIXON HlNi?L<=Y 
CICIX 
sy
 u rv«nwf i "> - /Deputy Clerk 
^R«* 
ADDENDUM "C 
L E A S E A G R E E M E N T 
THIS AGREEMENT Made and entered into by and betweer. 
JACQUELINE C. BARNES hereinafter referred to as "Lessor", and 
RICHARD C. WOOD and MARILYN P. WOOD, dba, FERNWOOD CANDY & Id 
CREAM COMPANY, a Partnership, hereinafter referred to as "Lessee" 
W I T N E S S E T H 
1. The Lessor, in consideration of the rents, 
covenants and agreements hereinafter recited does hereby leas£ 
and let unto the Lessee that certain real property and building 
situated at 3364 South 2300 East Street, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, heretofore known and operated as the "Palaco Leo Crci>
 t ,' 
Finn fay^y rnrnany" consisting of approximately 1,850 square fset 
of main floor space in the easterly, or frontage, and south 
portion of the building and the entire basement, designated by 
the said street address and situated in Salt Lake County, Stare 
of Utah, and more particularly described as: 
Beginning 33 feet West and 622 feet and 8 Inches 
North from the South Quarter corner of Section 
27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence North 3 8 
feet; thence West 100 feet; thence StTuth 3 8 
feet; thence East 100 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
f. PLAINTIFF* 
EXHIBIT 
ALSO: Beginning 33 feet West and 602 2/3 feet 
North from the South Quarter corner of Section 
27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence North 20 
feet; thence West 100 feet; thence South 20 
feet; thence East 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a right of way over: Beginning 
33 feet West and 583 feet North from the 
South Quarter corner of Section 27, Township 1 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
and running thence North 19 2/3 feet; thence West 
529.4 feet; thence South 19 2/3 feet; thence East 
529.4 feet to the place of beginning. 
2. The term of this lease shall be for a period cf 
ten (10) years from September 1, 1976 to and until September 1. 
I98G. In addition thereto and upon performing the covenants ar.J 
agreements herein contained, the Lessee shall have the right c: 
first refusal to extend this lease for such additional term 
' A v ,i>i ; » > \ , i i 
and upon such rentals and conditions as the Lessor shall be villind 
to lease the same to any other person. 
3. The Lessee agrees to pay as rent for the said 
premises a minimum guaranteed rental of Seven Hundred Fifty ar.d 
No/100 ($750.00) each month payable in advance on the 1st day of 
each month, the first and last two (2) months payable fupon 
execution hereof. However, the monthly rent shall be adjusted 
upward or downward based upon the United State Cost of Living 
Index using August 1976 as a base, provided that the index m-st 
rise or fall 5% from the base or prior adjusted level before 
adjustments in the rent are made. 
4. The Lessee agrees that it shall pay all personal 
property taxes assessed upon the personal property situated upon 
the leased premises and used by the Lessee in the conduct of 
its business. The Lessor agrees that they shall pay the general 
property taxes upon the real property and building, subject to 
this Lease, including all special improvement taxes during the 
term of the Lease; Provided, however, that in the event that rhe 
general property taxes upon the said real property and building 
shall increase during the term of this lease more than five 
(5%) percent in excess of the taxes for the year 1976, that the 
Lessor shall pay such increase to and including the said five 
(5%) percent, and any increase in excess of five per cent (5%) 
J over the taxes for the year 1976 shall be paid 25% by the Lessor 
I and 75% by the Lessee. It is mutually understood that the taxes 
i 
I for the year 1976 and upon which the percentile increase shell 
be computed have not yet been assessed. The Lessor shall pay 
;; the said property taxes annually, and in the event the said taxes 
jl shall increase in any year in excess of the 5% as provided 
!! 
above, 751 of such increase shall be due the Lessor from the Lessi 
upon proof of payment of the same, and such amount, if any, shall 
be payable as additional rental not later than December 1 c: 
each and every year in which the additional tax is assessed. 
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5. The Lessee agrees that it shall pay all charges 
for utilities furnished it upon the leased premises, including 
but not limited to electrical power, natural gas and water. In 
addition, the Lessee agrees to maintain the parking area herein-
after described in a reasonably^clean condition, and to remove, 
when necessary, the accumulation of_snov from the same. Lessor/ 
will participate to the extent of -£S% of such cleaning and sncv 
removal costs. 
6. The Lessor agrees that within a reasonable time 
after the execution thereof the exterior of the building and 
roof will be renovated and exterior lighting will be repaired 
or installed. Lessor agrees to maintain the exterior of the 
building and roof in good condition and shall make or cause to 
be made any necessary repairs to the surfacing of the parking 
areas. Ircs-&ee shall maintain the exterior .lighting and Lesser •</,' 
shall particiapte to the extent of 25% of such maintenance costs. 
7. Included in the property hereby leased to the Lesse 
by theLessor are certain items of personal property, as the same 
are more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and by reference made a part hereof. The Lessee agrees that 
should it elect to make repairs or renovations to any of the perse 
property, appliances, or fixtures as described in Exhibit MAn, 
that the costs of said repairs or renovations are the responsib-
ility of the Lessee. It is understood that certain items listed 
in Exhibit "A" are of such condition that they are presently 
unsuited for use by the Lessee, or that their condition indicates 
that they might not remain in a practical working condition for 
the term of this Lease. The Lessee may remove or discard such 
items, Jbut wUl .advise the Lessor previous to discarding any such 
personal property, appliances or fixtures. All other items liste 
in Exhibit "A" will be returned to the Lessor upon the expiration 
of the term of this Lease in as good condition as when the sarc 
were received by the Lessee, reasonable use and wear excepted. 
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8. The Lessor agrees that they shall insure the leased 
premises against loss by fire or other casualty in an amount equal 
to the reasonable value thereof. In the event that the leased 
premises shall be damaged by fire or other casualty so as to be 
capable of being repaired within a reasonable time, Lessor shall 
repair the same and during the time that repairs are being msfe, 
a just and fair portion of the rent due hereunder, according ~o 
the nature of the damages sustained and according to the extent 
to which Lessee is deprived of the use of the premises, shall be 
abated. Provided, however, that if there is a total destruction 
of the premises by fire or otherwise or if the damage is so 
substantial as to render the premises untenable or incapable of 
repair within a reasonable time, during the term of this lease, 
then and in that event, this Lease shall, at the option of the 
Lessor cease. In such event, the Lessor shall have a period of 
thirty (30) days from the date of such damage and destruction to 
exercise the said option to rebuild. In the event that the lessor 
shall elect to rebuild, they shall be allowed a reasonable period, 
not to exceed six (6) months in which to complete such rebuild-
! ing. Provided, further, that during the period of such rebuilding 
and until such time as the premises are restored, the Lessee shall 
jnot be liable for rent hereunder. 
j, 9. The Lessee agrees that it shall obtain a policy 
J of public liability insurance, which policy of insurance shall 
lj insure the Lessee and the Lessor as their respective interes-s 
|| may appear against public liability arising out of the use &r.5 
li occupancy of the leased premises and the carrying on of busir.ess 
II 
:: therein, such liability insurance policy to have minimum liri^s 
i! 
j; of not less than $100,000.00 for each personal injury and 
ji 
lj $300, 000. 00 for each occurrance. 
i! 
I 10. The Lessor, as assignee of the interest of Taul 
!• V. Cushing, Jr. and VaLene Cushing, husband and wife, are the 
II Lessees of the following described real property, adjacent *c 
Ijtho premises heroin leaned and used as a parking lot: 
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!! 
• Commencing 33 feet West and 713 feet North from |j the South Quarter corner of Section 27, Township 
1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridiar., 
and running thence West 134 feet; thence South 11* 
feet to the boundary of a private driveway; thence 
East 69 feet to back of building; thence North 
57 2/3 feet; thence East 65 feet; thence North 
52 1/3 feet on 2300 East to point of beginning. 
I The Lessor does hereby sublet and sublease to the lessee 
lithe said described real property, for a term concurrent with -he 
term of this Lease or any extension thereof, upon the Lessee 
performing all of the covenants and agreements of the said Lease 
Agreement, including the payment of rent thereunder, according 
to its terms, a copy of the said Lease Agreement being attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by reference made a part hereof. It 
is mutually understood and agreed that any breach of the terrs 
I or conditions of the said Lease Agreement by the Lessee as the 
sub-tenant of the Lessor shall be a breach of this Lease Agreement I 
entitling the Lessor to the use of any of the remedies for s.ch 
breach herein provided for. Lessee and Lessor shall cooperaie in 
renewing the said parking lot lease in accordance with the 
provisions thereof. 
i| 11. The Lessee may, upon obtaining the written crnsent 
of the Lessor, make reasonable alterations of the leased prerises; 
provided, however, that such alterations shall become and reir.ein 
[I a part of the lease premises upon the termination of this Leese 
|| Agreement, and provided, further, thatsuch alterations shall be i 
l! 
I made at the expense of the Lessee. I 
[| j 
,. 12. In the event that the rents herein provided for, 
II or any part thereof, shall be unpaid at the time the same shell 
jl become due and payable, or for thirty (30) days thereafter, :r J 
|j if any default shall be made in the provisions herein contaired 
•t i 
Mto be performed by the Lessee, its successors or assigns, the I 
ji I 
ij Lessor, upon the expiration of such thirty-day period may give I 
I! five (5) days written notice of such default to the Lessee. If 
such default shall not be corrected within such five (5) day | 
|j period, thereafter it shall be lawful for the said Lessor, t_rir 
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successors or assigns, to take possession of the said premise--
and every part thereof. Upon such default in any of the provisions 
i herein, and upon the taking of such possession, the Lessor sr.^ 11 
have the right to relet the said premises for such rent and u>on 
such terms as the Lessor may reasonable obtain, and if a sufficient 
sum shall not be thus realized from the said reletting by the 
Lessors, after paying the expenses of such reletting, to satisfy 
the damages and the rent herein provided for, the Lessee agrees 
to satisfy and pay all such damages and deficiencies. 
13. It is further expressly understood and agreed, 
however, that this Lease may not be assigned nor may the prerrises 
be otherwise sublet without the written consent of the Lesser 
first had and obtained, which said consent shall not be unreason-
ably withheld. 
14. The Lessor and the Lessee each agree that shculd 
they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses 
including a reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing this agreement, whether such enforcement is 
pursued by filing of suit or otherwise. 
15. The terms and conditions of this agreement shall 
apply to and be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
II successors, assigns, and personal representatives of the resrect-
I ive parties hereto. 
»! 
|i 16. Lessor hereby grants to Lessee the right of 
H 
|| f i r s t r e f u s a l to purchase the leased premises on such terms and 
ii cond i t i ons as Lessor s h a l l be w i l l i n g to s e l l the same to any 
|! o t h e r p e r s o n . - f r r / ^ ^ ,< / « s ^ ^ . ^ ^ s<v/*»#;* fun /«£/>
 af ^ 
|j IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the p a r t i e s he r e to have hereunto 
'! s e t t h e i r hands t h i s I day of September, 1976. j ! _ t^r-. 
jl \ LESSOR ' -N./ LESSEE 
II \ 
/ ' FERNWOOD CANDY & ICE CREA3. CO., 
a Partnership, 
JACQUELINE C. BARNES 
RICHARD C. WOOD 
MARILYN 1». WOOD 
KXEHEIT A 
5 Heavy s l a b t a b l e s , wood 
^ 2 0 Oak Capta in 'a ohaire 
»^1 odd wooden ohair 
<-l C o l o n i a l Sideboard 
«^1 mantle w a l l p ieoe ( b a r r e l s ) 
«- 1 Nat iona l oash r e g i s t e r , t FR93723U5-22 
^ 1 oash r e g i s t e r s t a n d , one drawer 
s*L three s e o t i o n oandy show case f\ 
^1 ant ique marble t o p h a l l t r e e w i t h mirror / 
u 1 H i l l r 6 n ffnr1rtff-7rn4f«.^rrrndrin~4Qft-oreftTn-ohegt 
1
 -JH?haokeratfft Vint find ooat paok ' ' ' 
^1 three drawer maple hutoh 
w l s i x f t . 8 h o l e f r e e s e r oabinet (B) 
- 1 n ine f t * 10 ho le f r e e z e r cab ine t (A) f 
^0. Hclauu-Ifl.J.y Fuu^Lalat>4.le J/ 'l"' 
^L-=glass—eone—cabinet ' t 
w
-3r-&eyers ^ Bu l la t m^a, l t ~ a i x e r 
large baok b a r , b e v e l e d p l a t e mirror 
*^2 matching gold framed oval mirrors 
^JUEajnilton Ban eh n n l t TnlTer ' ' ~ y/?/0/,, 
^ 4 f e * t o u i l oash ro f i l a»er if&/>/***<* ty , & W 7 /Y &&-
<^L e i g h t h o l e f r e e z e r oabinet (C) 
*s\ rta^nlfc** a t e e l 8 f t » soda foMSte>ia 
\/\ Hobart d i s h washer 
r& oandy s c a l e s 
•i-^het—ohooolate-dlrepenser \ ' K i
 r 
L^l^^ha^eeV-^otanter-^±bhrgrill-wor3c " ' ; 
»-^C-^twenty-six--fir.-U--shaped~oount)Br 7 
*<L metal h a l l t r e e 
t^9 short w ire bar s t o o l s 
t^l o h i l d s t a b l e with, three onairs 
l
- 0 . 2 wire i o e oream o h a i r s , padded 
v
-^10 u p h o l s t e r e d benches 
^ 5 r e o t a n g u l a r , formica top t a b l e s 
*-^3 round, w i r e i o e oream t a b l e s 
i^-l V x 5 ' mirror w i t h ornate French frame 
«^1 wooden r e c e i v i n g oabinet ( f o r pans) . 
t<9.~-3^i^red^felt drape-with valanoa 
1
-"4~9C4—iight-rose-drape w i t h valapoe ' 
u ^ 2 ~ 6 ! ~ l i g h t - r o s e - d r a p e s w i t h v a l a pces 
—1 metal "Custom B u i l t Southern" s ink 
~ 1 F r i g i d a i r e i o e maker 
v l Toledo s c a l e s 
*- 2r -Vacu la tor~2 burner hot p l a t e 
"Imbalance -eoales ~* \^t^^CJ 
,/ 1 "Pelange" i o e oream coale 
7 r e f r i g e r a t o r u n i t s (compressor & motor) 
v#W-
 / . 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, as of the 15th day of July, 1964, by and between HAROLD 
DEBENHAM and NELLIE D. DEBENHAM, husband and wife, and CHARLES 
EVERETT DEBENHAM and MARLENE A. DEBENHAM, husband and wife, herein-
after xeferred to as MLeasorfl,f and PAUL V, CUSHING, JR. and VALENZ 
CUSHING, his wife, hereinafter referred to as "Lessees"; 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
In consideration of the sum of $3,300,00 payable monthly at 
the rate of $55-00 per month, receipt of $110.00 as the first and 
r 
last months rental under said Lease is hereby acknowledged by less-
ors, the first regular payment to pecoma due on the 15th day of 
August, 1964, and each payment thereafter to become due on the 15zh 
day of each and every month thereafter during the term of this leaae, 
Lessors do hereby lease, l,et and demise unto the Leasees the follow-
ing described real property »icua««<{ in Salt Lake County, State cf 
Utah: 
v ivytommencing 33 feet West and 713 feet North from 
)lVy the South % corner of Section 27, Township 1 South, 
^" j ^ Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
^ running thence West 134 feet, thence South 110 feet 
^ . to the boundry of a private driveway, thence East 
69 feet to back of building, thence North 57 2/3 
feet, thence East 65 feet, thence North 52 1/3 ieet 
on 2300 East to point of beginning. 
The Lessors own undivided interests in the above described property. 
TO HAVE AND HOLD the same until the 14th day of July, 19t3, 
upon the following terms and conditions: 
1. The said premises are leased to the Lessees for the 
purpose of providing parking space for the use and benefit of the 
customers of the Lessees and Lessors and the same shall be used i.3 
a parking lot for the use and benefit of the customers of Lessee* 
and Lcnaori, It is further agreed between tha parties that all 
MAB1Y HONNOW A MADUtN 
costs of repair and maintenance required to maintain the parking 
facilities shall be shared equally between the parties hereto, and 
shall be made only upon written consent between the parties. 
2. The Lessees agree that they shall immediately place 
along the South line of said premises where the same adjoin a pri-
vate right of way running East and West, a sufficient barrier of 
concrete curbing or equal material anchored securely to the ground 
to create A division between the parking area and the right of way 
to prevent unauthorized persons from using said private right of 
way. 
3. The Lessees shall have six (6), or more, five (5)r year 
terms in addition to the term herein provided at Lessees' electica, 
provided that the lease may be renewed for only one five (5) year 
term at a time giving the Lessors notice in writing, to said Less-
ors or their designated representatives, at least sixty (60) days 
prior to the end of the term or the end of the five (5) year period 
thereafter. Rental to be charged shall be adjusted upward or down-
ward based upon the United States Government cost of living index, 
rise or decline, changes as set out therein, and to effect this 
lease must rise or fall of five (57.) per cent. 
4. It is agreed by and between the parties that the Less-
ees shall conduct upon said leased premises only those businesses 
and associated services that are allowed by law and the Lessees 
agree that they will comply with all zoning and safety requirement 
and that they will hold the Lessors harmless from any claim or lia-
bility arising out of Lessees conduct upon said premises. 
5. It is agreed by and between the parties that IJI the 
event of default of the terms of this agreement or should it beccna 
necessary for the enforcement of this agreement, be it either partv, 
that tho defaulting party or the party adjudged to bo at fault will 
LAW ornoa. 
MAWCY. RONNOW A M A D I I N 
• »4 IA«V »HU • H U ^ -
• • i r i A«t « i i * • H I AM 
pay a l l costs that may be incurred, including a reasonable attorney's 
! 
fee , j 
6. It is agreed by and between the parties that this Lease' 
i 
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to be benefit of the heirs, 
assigns, administrators, and executors of the parties. 
7. All payments to Lessors as herein set forth shall be 
made to Nellie D. Debenham, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agree-
ment on the / t i day of July, 1964» 
LESSORS: 
7^/'& 9? ,^/f ,, Arr^ 
^^*&^£^„ -& ^^•^ 
"7/jf.^ur. <?. /}&«£«„ 
8 8 . 
OUr 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
^ the I If day of Ju^y, 1964, personally appeared before 
me HAROLD DEBENHAM and NELLIE D# DEBENHAM, husband and wife, and I 
i ( 
! CHARLES EVERETT DEBENHAM and MARLENE A. DEBENHAM, husband and wife ,i 
i » 
(who acknowledged to me that they signed the foregoing Lease Agree- ' 
i 
jment. 
I jlfa&L&U •' 
|My Commission Expires] NOTAKY PUBLIC, Residing ac: 
!  :'<;t<>n.in<i LAW opptcaa MAdCY, RONNOW & MAD6CN 
%1A «A«T I N O t O U I N 
ftAkT l A D I CITY, UTAH • « • • * 
JA</&L0^ (JCL
 : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
^ the /If day of July, 1964, personally appeared befsre 
me PAUL V. GUSHING, JR. and VALENE GUSHING, his wife, who acknow-
ledged to me that they signed the foregoing Lease Agreement. 
3M$d^<Ctt* 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing a t : ^ cC^A fi^VCj^, ^ 7 , \U ^ 
JMy Commission Expires! sdt jc.f J 7, / / 6 0 
-A-
LAW OPFICIS 
MABEY. RONNOW & MADBIN 
• r« «*«T ino » O U I H 
.ACT L»»« CITV, UUH •«•«»• 
ADDENDUM "D" 
September 6, 1979 
4r. Richard \*x>d 
Pemwood Candy & Ice Crean Co. 
150 Vfest Cccinonwealth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
KE: Palace Lease 
[>ear Mr. Wood: 
^s you are aware, the lease which we negotiated for the Fernwxd Palace and Jackie 
p^ T-ry^  in August, 1976, calls for periodic adjojstzrents based upen the cost of living 
increases. There has been each year a substantial increase in tho coqt of living 
*hich has exceeded the 5% rdLninxm required by the lease. Jackie, however, in order 
x> aoLXiii'Jodate you has not roc^ aerb&i a lease aceninent but because of the inflation 
irxl additional ocsts which she has now been required to bear, mast new pass csn these 
*Miticnal costs to you for prospective months. We have obtained the cost of living 
figures frm the United States government and find that a 6.8% increased occurred 
frcn 1976 to 1977, a 9.0% increase for 1978 and a 11.3% increase far 1979. The irxiex 
vis increased from 1976 level of 171.1 to the present level of 218.9 which is a 
27.9% increase. Applying this to the base anount of $750, the base rent for the 
>alace, effective September 1, 1979, is $960. In arkHtion to this increase, the 
marking lot lease has new increased to $200 per month and your share of the lease 
^ayroent en the parking lot will, henceforth, be $100 per month far a total payment 
>f $1,060 per ra±it±u 
finally, paragraph four of the lease requires $ou to psy 75% of the increase taxes, 
:ar each year, if the increase is in excess of 5% over the 1976 taxes. The 1976 taxes 
«re $394.84, the 1577 taxes were $432.05 which represents a 9.4% increase, an increase 
if $37.21 of which your share is $27.91. The 1978 taxes were $516.04 far an increase 
>f $121.20 over the 1976 taxes of which your share is $90.90, for total taxes far 
J377 and 1978 of $118.81. Ke sincerely regret the necessity of passing on these 
substantial increases but with inflation of 11% per year you must understand that 
xir costs are also increasing. 
te will expect payment of the tax ancunt within the next 15 days and will expect the 
<eat payment for September to be adjusted in accordance with the above figures. 
Sincerely, 
Raymond A. Hintze 
-AH: It 
*: Jackie Barnes 
ADDENDUM "E" 
A. RICHARD WALKER 
RAYMOND A. H1NTZE 
3ERKW WASHBURN 
J KIRK RECTOR 
WALKER & HINTZE, INC. 
A Pro*a*MDnal Corporation 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 202. HERITAGE PLAZA 
4685 HIGHLAND DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84117 
TELEPHONE (801) 278-4747 
January 2 3 , 1980 
Ga^len S. Young, Jr. 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt.Lake City, Utah 84106 
RE: Fernwood Palace - Jackie Barnes Lease 
Dear Gaylen: 
As I reported to you on the telephone, I have met with Jackie concerning 
the Palace lease with Fernwoods and she is willing to reduce the rent 
to $1,000 per rent and forego her claim to the taxes which have accrued. 
Please let us know if this is satisfactory. 
Sincere^ 
Layjjrond A. H i n t z e 
RAHx I t 
If EXHIBIT lfc
 °l 
ADDENDUM "F 
WALKER & HINTZE, INC. 
A Professorial Corporation 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 202. HERITAGE PLAZA 
4685 HIGHLAND DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 64117 
I RICHARD WALKER 
AYMGNDA HINTZE 
ERK W WASHBURN 
KIRK RECTOR 
TELEPHONE (801) 278-4747 
March 24, 1980 
Mr. Richard C. Wood 
150 West Commonwealth Avenue 
Salt* Lake City, Utah 84115 
RE: Fernwood Palace 
Dear Dick: 
Your letter of March 17, 1980 is received and has been reviewed 
with the Personal Representative of the Jackie Barnes estate. 
We are unwilling to accept your counter proposal on the lease. 
We would be willing to advertise the Palace for rent and obtain a 
tenant for your space and, providing that we are able to obtain a 
subsitute leasee on the same terms as your lease, we would hold 
you responsible for only the cost of leasing and the rent until 
the new tenant takes possession of the building. Otherwise, we 
would expect full compliance with the present lease agreement as 
modified by our January 25, 1980 letter. 
Since 
RAH:It 
c. Ferris Collett 
ADDENDUM "G 
r^jLi. L<ir^ <~xx:y, u t an 
October 12, 198Z 
Mr. .Richard C. Wood 
Femwood Candy and Ice Cream Ccnpany 
JL50 West Ctmnorwealth Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Mr. Wood: 
On September 6, 1979 Our pother's attorney, Mr. Raymond Hintze, corresponded 
with you regarding provisions set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of our lease 
dated in SepteTiber of 1976. A copy of that letter is enclosed. 
A base rental adjustment was made at that time frcm $750.00 per month to $960.00. 
As indicated in the letter, certain adjustments were set forth regarding the 
real estate property taxes and parking lot lease. The total amount indicated 
which was'due each month was $1,060.00. By apparant mutual error the rental 
payments, including the price index increase, have been only $1,000.00 per month. 
The enclosed calculations shoJ what the actua] rents should have been since the 
July 1979 base was started. These figures are derived from the U.5. Department of 
Labor,* Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index. September and October 
statistics are not yet available. 
You will also note that since the date of last adjustment the real estate property 
taxes have increased from $51S.04 to $688.00 (1982), an increase of $171.96. 
The terms 'of the lease call for you to pay 75% of this increase. This amounts 
to S128.97." These arrounts may be vajified at the office of the County Treasurer, 
tax serial # 17-1781. The combined total of back rental payments due us combined 
with the above property tax liability .is $6,57*7.57. 
You will also find enclosed a copy of a lease agreement executed by and between 
ouirselves and Verl and Jean Staten on August 31, 19P2. Under the terms of the 
Feimwood-Barnes lease in paragraph 10, it was agreed to sublease the parking lot 
to you. No provision1 is evident for the sharing of costs of this lease and yet 
we note in Mr. Hintze1 s letter of September 6, 1979 that your share was to be 
one half of the total parking lot lease payment. VTe are willing to abide by this 
arrangement. 
As of November 1, 1982, your lease payment shall be SI,239.04 plus one half of 
the parking lot lease making a total of $1,389.04. 
Since we have contracted for major roof repairs in addition to the recently com-
pleted exterior re-finishing, we would appreciate having your check in the amount 
of $6,577.57 by November 1, 1982 in addition to the rental payment noted above. 
Very truly yours, 
H PLAINTIFFS | EXHIBIT 
I - 4 £ -
ADDENDUM "H" 
I3®>!5 
Fox & Company Certified Public Accountants 
36 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11508 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84147 
(801) 531-6888 
BARNES, ET AL. v s . WOOD, ET AL. 
LEASE AND RENT COMPUTATIONS 
CONTENTS 
Page 
Building Lease Increases 
1976 through 1984, using $750 as base rent 1 
1979 through 1984, using $900 as base rent 2 
Parking Lease Increases 3 
Property Tax Increases 4 
Total Deficits 5 
Barnes, et al. vs. Wood, et al. 
Building Lease Increases 
Period Start 
September i, 
Septeaber 1, 
September 1, 
Septeaber 1, 
Septeaber 1, 
Septenber 1, 
Septeaber 1, 
Seoteaber 1, 
ing 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1988 
1961 
1982 
1963 
-1-
Consuier 
Price 
Index * 
171.9 
183.3 
197.8 
221.1 
249.4 
276.5 
292.8 
388.3 < 
-2-
Yearly 
CPI % 
Increase 
Base 
6.63% 
7.91% 
11.78* 
12.80S 
18.87% 
5.98* 
Hrt 2.56% 
-3-
Konthly 
Rent Per 
flgreeoent 
758.88 
799.74 
863.88 
964.66 
1838.13 
1286.37 
1277.49 
1277.49 
-4-
Annual 
Rent Per 
Acreeaent 
9888.88 
9596.86 
18356.82 
11575.92 
13857.59 
14476.44 
15329.84 
15329.84 
98722.51 
-5-
flctual 
Rent 
Collected 
9888.88 
9888.88 
9388.88 
13755.88 
10880.ee 
18888.88 
18888. C8 
18888.88 
81255.88 
-6-
Rent 
Deficit 
(4-5) 
8.88 
596.86 
1656.82 
828.92 
2257.59 
3676.44 
4529.84 
4529.84 
17467.51 
-7-
Interest 
Accrued « 
8 
383.73 
583.78 
379.43 
856.58 
969.12 
673.72 
288.67 
4844.829 
-8-
Total 
Deficit 
(6+7) 
0.88 
988.59 
1636.88 
1288.35 
3114.17 
4645.56 
5283.55 
4738.51 
21511.54 
* The consumer price index for each period is oeasured at August for 
each year. 
« Interest has been coaouted as follows: The rent deficit accrues 
interest frt» Sarch 1 (lid-year) of the year in question through 
toy 14, 1981 at W , coapounded annually, plus May 15, 1981 through 
August 14, 1984 at 18%, coapounded annually. 
# w No increase *as applied to the rent base since the CPI increased 
less than the 5* required by the agreement. 
1 
Barnes, et al. vs. Wood, et al. 
Building Lease Increases 
— A S S U K lease payeents starting 9/1/79 are $988/s»nth — 
Period Starting 
-1- -3- -3- -4- -5- -6- -7- -B-
Consuaer Yearly Monthly Annual Actual Rent Total 
Price CPI t Rent Per Rent Per Rent Deficit Interest Deficit 
Index * Increase Agreeaent Agreeaent Collected (A-5) Accrued ** (6+7) 
Septeaber 1, 
Seotecber 1, 
Septeaber 1, 
September 1, 
Septeaber 1, 
1979 
1968 
1981 
1982 
1983 
221.1 
249.4 
276.5 
292.8 
388.3 *** 
Base 
12.88% 
18.87% 
5.98* 
2.56* 
988.88 
1815.28 
1125.51 
1191.86 
1191.66 
18888.88 
12182.36 
13536.11 
14382.31 
14382.31 
65893.88 
18755.88 
18688.88 
18888.88 
18888.88 
18888.88 
53955.88 
45.88 
1382.36 
276S.11 
3582.31 
3582.31 
11138.88 
28.79 
524.58 
713.34 
528.98 
155.15 
1934.59 
65.79 
1985.85 
3419.45 
4823.21 
3657.45 
13872.77 
* The consumer price index for each period is measured at August for 
each year, 
« Interest has been computed as follows: The rent deficit accrues 
interest fro* torch 1 did-year) of the year in question through 
Nay 14, 1981 at 6%, compounded annually, plus Nay 15, 1931 through 
August 14, 1384 at 10%, compounded annually. 
« * No increase Mas applied to the rent base since the CPI increased 
less than the 5* required by the agreeaent. 
o 
Barnes, et al. vs. Wood, et al. 
Parking Lot Increases 
Period Starting 
September 1, 1979 
Septeaber 1, 1988 
Septeaber 1, 1S81 
Septeaber 1, 1982 
Septeaber 1, 1983 
-1-
Honthly 
Rent Per 
flgreeaent 
m 
2@e 
m 
m 
390 
-2-
ftnnual 
Rent Per 
flgreeaent 
24M 
2489 
2488 
2488 
3688 
-3-
75* Of 
Annual 
Rent 
1888 
1888 
1888 
1888 
2788 
9988.88 
-4-
fictual 
Rent 
Collected 
1288 
1288 
1288 
1208 
1288 
6888.88 
-5-
Rent 
Deficit 
(3-4) 
608 
688 
688 
688 
1588 
3988.88 
-6-
Interest 
Accrued « 
277.31 
227.66 
158.16 
89.24 
66.45 
818.82 
-7-
Total 
Deficit 
(5+6) 
877.31 
827.66 
758.16 
689.24 
1566.45 
4718.82 
« Interest has been ceaputed as follows: The rent deficit accrues 
interest frca March 1 (aid-year) of the year in question through 
May 14, 1981 at 6%, coepounded annually, plus May IS, 1981 through 
August 14, 1934 at 19%, compounded annually. 
3 
•• BASE PROPERTY TAX •• 
1976 actual property tax 
Multiply t>y 
394.84 
1.05 
Lessor's ,aximu» property tax 414.58 
sssss s s 
•• ALLOCATION OF TAX INCREASES »» 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
-1-
Property 
Taxes 
Paid 
432.04 
516.04 
557.39 
582.37 
664.44 
688.00 
940.04 
-2-
Base 
Property 
Tax 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
-3-
Excess 
Over 
Base 
17.46 
101.46 
142.81 
167.79 
249.86 
273.42 
525.46 
-4-
75X Of 
Excess 
<3x75X> 
13.10 
76.09 
107.11 
125.84 
187.40 
205.07 
394.10 
1108.70 
-5-
Interest 
Accrued 
8.74 
43.55 
51.78 
50.26 
55.03 
36.10 
27.26 
272.72 
-6-
Total 
Deficit 
<4*5) 
21.84 
119.64 
158.89 
176.10 
242.43 
241.17 
421.35 
1381.42 
3 S S S S S S J 
Interest frss been computed as follows: November 30th of the year in 
question through May 14, 1981 at 6*, compounded annually. May 15, 1981 
through August 14, 1984 at 10*, compounded annually. 
•• ALLOCATION OF TAX INCREASES •» 
Increases through 1979 are waived 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
-1-
Property 
Taxes 
Paid 
582.37 
664.44 
688.00 
940.04 
-2-
Base 
Property 
Tax 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
414.58 
-3-
Excess 
Over 
Base 
167.79 
249.86 
273.42 
525.46 
-4-
75* 0£ 
Excess 
<3x75X> 
125.84 
187.40 
205.07 
394.10 
912.40 
-5-
Interest 
Accrued 
50.26 
55.03 
36.10 
27.26 
168.65 
-6-
Total 
Deficit 
<4*5) 
176.10 
242.43 
241.17 
421.35 
1081.05 
Interest ha« been computed as follows: November 30th of the year in 
question through May 14, 1981 at 6*, compounded annually. May 15, 1981 
through August 14, 1984 at 10*, compounded annually. 
4 
Barnes, et al. vs. Wood, et al. 
Total Deficits 
Building Lease Agressent 
Parking Lot Agreement 
Property Tax Agreement 
Total Deficits 
Without 
Modification 
To flgrenent 
(21,511.54 
4,718.82 
1,381.42 
(27,611.78 
With 
Modification 
To flgrewent 
$13,872.77 
4,718.82 
1,081.05 
$18,872.64 
5 
ADDENDUM " I " 
REGION VI! — IOWA • KANSAS • MISSOURI • NEBRASKA 
REGION VHI— COLORADO • MONTANA • NORTH DAKOTA • SOUTH DAKOTA • UTAH • WYOMING 
REGIONS VII AND VIII — VS. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR • 
911 WALNUT STREET • KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
MOUNTAIN-PLAINS REGION 
ELLIOTT A. BROWAR, REGIONAL COMMISSIONER 
THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
AUGUST 1983 
Ihe U.S. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) increased 0.3 percent 
from July to August 1983. The August index of 300.3 (1967=100) was 2.6 percent higher 
than in August 1982. Ihe Kansas City CPI-U rose 1.3 percent from June and was 5.7percent 
higher than in August 1982. 
Percent Changes in U.S. CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) 
Changes from preceding month 
Expenditure Category Mar. Apr, May 
1983 
June July Aug, 
12 months 
ended 
Aug. 1983 
All Items 
flood and Beverages 
Housing 
Apparel and upkeep 
Transportation 
Medical Care 
Entertainment 
Other Goods and Services 
0.1 
0.6 
0 
1.3 
0.1 
0 
0.5 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
1. 
0. 
0, 
0.1 
0.3 
-0.1 
0.4 
0.3 
0.4 
0 
0.4 
-0.3 
0.7 
0.6 
0.2 
1.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
2.6 
1.8 
1.5 
2.9 
2.1 
8.0 
3.9 
11.9 
HCMEOWNERSHIP CHANGES 
In accordance with plans announced in October of 1981, a new treatment of 
homeownership costs was introduced into the CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) with 
release of the January 1983 data on February 25. The CPI-U based on the old method for 
homeownership (CPI-U old series) is available through June 1983. Ihe CPI for Urban Wage 
Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) will not be affected by this change until 1985. 
Additional information on the CPI homeownership change can be obtained from the Kansas 
City Regional Office of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
LOCAL AREA CPI DATA 
Local area CPI indexes are by-products of the national CPI program. Because each 
local index is a sr.all subset of the national index, it has a smaller sample size and is, 
therefore, subject to substantially more sampling and other measurement error than the 
national index. As a result, local area indexes show greater volatility than the national 
[R 23,1983 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
ALL URBAN CONSUMERS 
CPI-U 
AUGUST 1983 
U.S. CITY AVERAGE KANSAS CITY DENVER ST. LOUIS 
1 o i l , coal , and bottled gas . . . 
Id furnishings and operation . . . 
1967-100 
300.3 
284.9 
292.2 
282.5 
294.0 
258.8 
250.2 
299.4 
339.1 
321.0 
217.1 
324.8 
346.6 
103.7 
238.2 
355.8 
103.0 
375.1 
476.5 
619.0 
439.1 
238.0 
197.3 
188.3 
164.2 
205.7 
302.4 
298.0 
365.0 
360.0 
389.8 
246.6 
1
 289.0 
349.2 
Percent 
Orange From 
1 Month TTear 
0.3 2.6 
0.1 1.8 
0.1 1.7 
-0 .1 0.6 
0.1 3.2 
-0 .6 - 2 . 5 1 
0.2 1.1 
0.2 2.7 
0.1 1.7 
0.4 4.0 
0 3.3 
0.1 1.5 
0.4 0.7 
0.6 
0.5 5.4 
1.0 6.6 
0.3 
-0 .1 5.3 
- 0 . 3 5.0 
0 - 6 . 2 
- 0 . 3 8.6 
-0 .4 2.0 
1.2 2.9 
0.1 2.5 
3.4 3.1 
0.9 0.6 
0.7 2.1 
0.7 1.9 
0.5 4.9 
0.6 8.0 
0.7 8.0 
0.2 3.9 
0.5 11.9 
1967-100 
301.3 
280.5 
285.4 
272.7 
290.2 
245.7 
250.8 
284.3 
320.3 
323.3 
225.7 
327.8 
348.4 
105.6 
202.2 
298.7 
104.7 
393.7 
529.9 
190.6 
535.1 
236.4 
214.3 
211.9 
197.3 
232.1 
290.1 
287.5 
348.6 
1 376.7 
1 416.4 
232.9 
! 286.8 
357.6 
Percent 
Change Frca 
2 Hontns l Year 
Ago Ago 
1.3 5.7 
-0 .5 0.9 
-0 .5 0.7 
-1 .5 -0 .8 
-2 .4 0.8 
-2 .7 -4 .9 1 
-0 .2 1.2 ! 
-2 .9 0.6 
0.4 1.5 
1.4 3.6 
0 3.0 
2.1 8.9 
2.7 10.4 
0.7 
0.8 5.3 
-0 .1 6.4 
3.6 
3.1 9.3 
4.3 9.8 
0.3 1.3 
4.5 10.1 
-0 .3 3.1 
0.1 3.7 
6.0 2.4 
-5 .2 5.3 
3.2 4.1 
1.0 1.3 
1.1 0.6 
-0 .6 14.2 
2.3 9.9 
2.6 10.5 
2.3 4.5 
1.8 11.5 
1967-100 
265.4 
263.6 
233.5 
260.4 
267.3 
322.7 
Percent 
Change Frcn 
1 hontn l Year 
Ago Ago 
-0.5 3.1 
-2.3 2.6 
*1.2 1.5 
0.7 3.3 
0.7 9.4 
0.4 1.8 
1967-100 
281.8 
306.0 
252.4 
256.5 
| 300.5 
| 335.2 
Percent | 
Change Froa 
1 Month 1 Year 
•» J 
-0 .4 0.6 
-1.1 3.6 
-1 .7 -3 .2 
1.5 2.2 
-1 .9 -2 .3 
1.3 4.7 
oer 1982-100 for U.S. and Kansas City; Nsvenber 1982-100 for Denver and St. louis 
1978-100 for Denver and Kansas City 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
URBAN WAGE EARNERS AND CLERICAL WORKERS 
CPI-W 
AUGUST 1983 
U.S. CITY AVERAGE KANSAS CITY DENVER ST. LOUIS 
, ITEKS . 
tod 
Meats, poultry, f ish, and eggs . . . . . . 
Percent 
Chanqe Fran 
1 Month 1 Year | 
1967*100 Ago A90 
299.5 0.4 2.4 
285.1 0 1.7 
292.2 0 1.6 
281.5 -0.1 0.6 
292.5 0.1 3.2 
258.4 -0.7 -2.5 
249.4 0.2 1.1 
295.1 0.1 2.9 
339.9 0.2 1.8 
324.3 0.4 4.0 
219.7 0 3.6 
324.3 0.4 1.2 
346.4 0.7 0 
237.6 0.5 5.4 
354.0 1.0 6.2 
385.2 0.7 -1.3 
376.8 -0.1 5.3 
476.6 -0.3 5.0 
621.5 0 -6.2 
438.7 -0.4 8.7 
234.8 -0.4 2.1 
196.3 1.2 2.9 
188.3 0.1 2.6 
165.8 3.1 3.0 
205.5 0.9 0.7 
304.1 0.7 2.0 
300.8 0.7 1.9 
355.7 0.4 4.3 
357.9 0.6 8.0 
387.0 0.7 8.0 
243.1 0.2 3.9 
288.0 0.6 12.6 
348.3 
Percent 
Qianoe From 
2 Months TTear 
1967-100 /90 J90 
299.3 0.3 5.5 
277.6 -0.3 0.8 
283.9 -0.3 0.7 
270.3 -1.2 -0.8 
279.6 -2.2 1.0 
247.5 -2.4 -4.8 
250.9 -0.3 1.2 
274.0 -2.0 0.2 
320.9 0.4 1.3 
321.0 1.5 3.8 
219.1 0.2 3.5 
325.4 -0.3 8.9 
343.3 -1.1 10.1 
202.2 0.8 5.3 
306.1 0.1 6.3 
394.7 -1.4 10.9 
394.7 3.1 9.1 
528.2 4.2 9.4 
196.9 0.3 -1.5 
534.7 4.5 10.2 
234.8 -0.8 3.6 
210.2 1.0 4.3 
219.0 5.2 2.5 
183.3 -3.3 7.3 
250.3 4.6 4.5 
292.1 1.1 1.3 
290.3 1.1 0.7 
338.7 -0.5 16.7 
376.5 2.2 10.0 
415.2 2.5 10.6 
245.6 2.0 4.6 
2S7.4 2.2 12.0 
355.3 
Percent 
Qiange Frcni ! 
nSntK TTear 
1967-100 A90 Asp 
268.6 -0.4 2.8 
263.5 -2.0 2.1 
231.0 -1.3 1.3 
261.9 0.6 3.1 
285.4 0.1 7.8 
337.9 0.4 1.8 
Percent 
Change From 
i Month PR 
196>100 Joo A* 
• 
283.2 -0.4 0. 
320.6 -1.1 3. 
253.2 -1.6 - 3 . 
251.7 1.5 2. 
303.0 -1.8 - 1 . 
335.7 1.2 5. 
! 
June 1978-100 for Denver and Kansas City 
DATA FOR SEPTEMBER WILL BE RELEASED ON OCTOBER 25. 
hacts About the 
Consumer Price Index 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a statistical 
measure of change, over time, in the prices of 
goods and services in major expenditure groups — 
such as food and beverages, housing, apparel, 
transportation, medical care, and entertainment -
typically purchased by urban consumers. It meas-
ures the change in prices by comparing what a 
sample "market basket" of goods and services 
cost today with what the same sample market 
basket cost at an earlier date. 
The CPI for All Urban Consumers covers about 
80 percent of the total noninstitutional population. 
It includes, in addition to wage earners and clerical 
workers, groups which historically have been ex-
cluded from CPI coverage — salaried workers, the 
self-employed, retirees, and the unemployed. 
The CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical 
Workers covers about 40 percent of the total 
noninstitutional population. 
3 
For further information on THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX-
Contact th.:
 U A D E p A R T M E N T OF LABOR 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
911 WALNUT STREET 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64106 
TELEPHONE: KANSAS CITY -{816)374-2481 
CPI HOTLINE - (816) 374-2372 
ST. LOUIS - (314)425-4511 
DENVER - (303)837-2467 
OFFICE HOURS - 8:00 • 4:30 CENTRAL TIME 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
911 Walnut Street 
Kansas City, Mo. 64106 
POSTAGE AND PEES PAIO 
US. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
LAB-441 
23085 001 10/20/82 KC 
LIBBABIAH 
S0ITTEB, AXLAND 2T AL 
BOX 1168 
SALT LAKE CITI 0T 
84110 
ADDENDUM "J" 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq., #2278 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for P la in t i f fs 
438 East 200 South, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
355-6677 
i * 
, • FILE: '4 :LC""'t " r : - ,c r 
SEP N 10 55 AM "8M 
• -* • - fr 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W. BARNES, et a l . 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs. 
RICHARD C. WOOD, et a l . , 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Civil No. C 83-498 
James S. Sawaya, Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I , RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, being f i r s t duly sworn, do say: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah, 
and am counsel for Plaintiff in the above-captioned action; 
2. In the course of my representation of Plaintiffs, I have 
expended in excess of 80 hours in the prosecution of this claim, including 
reviewing the leases and correspondence, drafting pleadings, preparing for, 
attending and conducting depositions, preparing Motions, drafting 
Interrogatories, interviewing witnesses, preparing tr ial exhibits, preparing 
Trial Brief, legal research, preparing for t r ia l and tr ia l of the action. 
The agreed rate of bill ing has been $85.00 per hour for a total of 
$6,800.00, and 85.5 hours for law clerk and associate time in the sum of 
$3,050.00, for a total of $9,850.00. 
n>r-C 
3. The attorneys1 fees expended in the course of this action are 
reasonable and are approximately twenty percent below my current bill ing 
rate. 
4. P la in t i f fs have incurred costs to date of t r i a l as follows: 
f i l i n g Complaint 
Service of Process 
Depositions 
Jury Fee 
$ 25.QO 
25.00 
425.34 
50.00 
TOTAL $526.34 
RICHARDS. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / 2 day of September, 1984. 
My Commission Expires 
6-16-85 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
A 
ADDENDUM "K" 
l i - 1 * 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. #0492 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2001 Elks Building 
139 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
'FlCED 111 C L E M S OFFICE 
SALTISH "T'JN:V . UTAH 
OCT'4! S a s W W 
H.DtXON HIK __. CLERK 
„ 3RD D!ST . "J 
8Y 
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* w ^ ' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W. BARNES, JR., DAVID 
C. BARNES, SUSAN B. NIELSON, 
dba THE BARNES FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. WOOD and MARILYN 
P. WOOD, dba FERNWOOD CANDY 
& ICE CREAM COMPANY, a 
partnership, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD D. 
BURBIDGE IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT 
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. C-83-498 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, being f i rst duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah, and 
am counsel for the Plaintiffs in the above-referenced action. 
2. The Amended Complaint in this action was filed upon Motion by the 
Plaintiffs in response to continual representations of Defendants that they 
received the modification and were justified in a receiving a modification on 
the grounds that the escalated lease payments to which they had previously 
agreed would "put them out of business" and like representations. Those 
representations, as shown by the evidence, were untrue. Although the Court 
did not find evidence of fraudulent intent, those claims would nevertheless 
s t i l l have been pursued by P la in t i f f s in order to support the correlative 
j issues respecting modification of the lease agreement. 
I 3. One of the contentions asserted by the Defendants was that the 
1 modification which they averred had been entered into was based upon 
consideration because they could have brought a lawsuit for equitable 
, adjustment of the rent. The equitable adjustment, of course, would have to 
I have been based upon the f inancial condition of the company. Accordingly, 
P la in t i f f s were compelled to put on the very same evidence which they 
presented .in opposition to , among others, that issue in order to show no 
consideration for the alleged modif ication. 
4. I t is my opinion that even in absence of fraud claims contained 
in th is lawsuit, the very same evidence would have been presented to the Court 
as i t responded d i rect ly to the defenses asserted by the Defendants, went to 
the c red ib i l i t y of the witnesses, and impacted d i rect ly on any questions of 
equity which arose in the proceeding. 
5. I t is my opinion that v i r tua l l y no additional time, e f for t or 
j 
expense was incurred in presenting the case with the inclusion of the claim of j 
I 
fraud. The same witnesses, documents, testimony and argument would have been , 
presented with or without the claim of fraud. 
6. I am fami l iar with the attorneys' fees charged by competent law 
firms in th is area for cases similar to the case presented to the Court. I t 
is my opinion that the fees charged are more than f a i r and reasonable and as 
has been presented to the Court by previous Af f idav i t , constitute a 
substantial discount f raff) the noma! b i l l i n g rate of our f i rm. 
DATED th is S day of Octobei 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this c^-day of October, 
1984. 
NOTAT^/UBLIC 
Res, 
AW-/
i/dtng at Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Conmission Expires: si on txpjre! 
ADDENDUM "L" 
FILE NO OSS-ifrS 
E: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: ( • COUNSEL PRESENT) 
y*\ + ^ • -r 
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HON 
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 D A T E 
• $f*/S'./9/i/. 
JUDGE 
BAILIFF 
vJ^ft Z&z**/ 
^£*^s£r^ 'd24^Jk£~<~ J£/&L^UJ 
It is the opinion of the Court- fhaf the fraud claim upon which 
Plaintiffs dia not prevail ? nri fh.» prngenn-i^n
 r* fb'tt theory 
reasonably involved; one-third nf fhp ri*np of plaintiff's counool, 
The amount claimed for attorneys fees is therpfnrp H^rpapQ^ hw 
one-third. The objection to the claim for jury fPP -i ^ sn„+..^ p<?,^ 
y 
2SS 
